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The Commvnist Parties in the Fight 
for the Masses 
B y  0. PIATNITSKY 
1. The Presentation of the Question 
HE resolution of the Second Congress on the funda- 
mental tasks of the Communist International (Part I,  
paragraph 4) reads as follows : 
"Only the Communist Party, if it really is the vanguard of the 
revolutionary class, if it contains all the best representatives of that 
class, if it consists of fully class conscious and devoted Communists, 
educated and hardened by the experience of stubborn revolutionary 
struggle, if this Party has managed to link itself inseparably with 
the whole life of its class and through this class with the whole of 
the masses of the exploited, and if it can imbue this class and these 
masses with complete confidence-only such a Party is capable of 
leading the proletariat in the most ruthless, determined and final 
struggle against all the forces of capitalism. 
"On the other hand, only under the leadership of such a Party 
can the proletariat develop the whole might of its revolutionary 
onslaught." 
Have we in the capitalist countries, after fifteen years' 
existence of the Comintern, such parties as fully satisfy all 
the above-enumerated requirements ? The reply to this ques- 
tion must be in the negative. But although not a single 
Communist Party in the capitalist countries completely satis- 
fie the requirements laid down in the resobtian of the Sec- 
ond Congress, nevertheless, in a number of7couritries (China, 
Germany, Poland), the Communist Parties have come close 
to them during this period. 
'The sections of the Cornintern have a number of achieve- 
'&* t i  record and I will deal here only with a f& of 
them. 
11. The Achievements of the Communist Parties 
The Communist International, unlike the Second Interna- 
tional, and the Communist Parties, unlike the parties .affili- 
ated to the Second International, during the fifteen years of 
their existence have achieved considerable successes in re- 
gard to the proper presentation of the question of the strug- 
gle against imperialist wars and in the organization of this 
struggle. As is well known, in 1914,' the Second International 
collapsed shamefully, precisely during the war and in con- 
nection with the war. 
Today, with the intensification of the antagonisms in the 
camp of the imperialists, the post-war Second International 
is again cracking up, and the fascization of its separate par- 
ties is being accelerated in the process'of transition to the 
* 
second round of revolutions and wars. 
During the fifteen years of its existence, the Comintern 
has achieved absolute clarity, not only in the principles of the 
question of the struggle against imperialist war, but also in 
regard to the strategy and tactics of this struggle. 
Various sections of the Communist International have 
proved that in this difficult and important quesiion of war 
they are striving to pursue, and in many cases are really 
pursuing, the line of the cornintern, are fighting against the 
stream of chauvinism, and are remaining true to the require- 
ments of proletarian internationalism. 
Let us take only a few examples. 
a) The Communist Party of France during the Morocco 
War. 
In 1925, French imperialism waged war against Morocco. 
At times the French suffered defeat. This called forth a 
wave of chauvinism in France. The bourgeois parties, in- 
c l d n g  the Socialist Party, furiously c m  far war against 
Morocco and did all they c6uld to support th is  war. The 
Communist Party alone waged a proper, O B Q # & ~ ~  struggle 
against this predatory war; and at meetings everywhere it 
openly exposed the predatory, colonial policy of France, 
fought for the independence of Morocco, and demanded the 
withdrawal of the French troups from the colonies. It. goes 
without saying that it is easier to adopt a defeatist position 
in a colonial war, which openly bears a predatory character, 
than in a war which the imperialists may claim to be a war 
for the defense of the country against the attacks of the 
powerful enemy. Nevertheless, the correct position taken 
up by the Communist Party of France was an exemplary 
one, the more. so that the Communist Party of France had 
been formed comparatively recently out of the Socialist 
Party, which during- the imperialist war was thoroughly in- 
fected with chauvinism. In 1 9 5  the Communist Party of 
France passed its examination on the question of war. 
b) There are still greater grounds for saying the same 
thing in regard to the struggle waged by the Communist 
Paity of China at the time the hordes of Chang Hsueh- 
liang seized the Chinese Eastern Railway, and during the 
Japanese invasion of Shanghai. What happened during the 
seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway? I t  is well known 
that not only the Chinese militarists, the Kuomintang, etc., 
but also the parties of the Second International in all the 
capitalist countries, in order to discredit the U.S.S.R., falsely 
depicted the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the 
Chinese militarists, who were backed by the imperialists, as 
a war against unequal treaties. The Northern militarists 
were also supported by the Trotskyists, Chen-Tu-hsuh and 
others. The Chinese Communists did not allow themselves 
to be influenced by this demagogy. In its propaganda, agita- 
tion, and in the yhole of its practical work, the Communist 
Party of China pursued the Leninist line and -fought against 
the Kuornintang and the militarists in its own country. 
During the invasion of Shanghai by the Japanese impe- 
rialists, the Communist Party of China succeeded in taking 
the lead in a mighty, anti-imperialist mass movement against 
the Japanese invaders, and it organized resistance to Jap- 
anese imperialism while continuing the struggle against the 
Kuomintang. 
And what about the glorious, heroic story of the Red 
Army in China ? After the treachery of Chiang Kai-Shek, 
who was supported by international imperialism, and the 
victory of the Kuomintang counter-revolution, a small group 
of armed men led by Communists fought its way out of the 
ring of enemies, retreated to the hills, began to rally around 
itself new forces, fortify itself in the territory it occupied, 
and gradually enlarged its territory. 
Enlisting to its side the broad masses of the peasantry in 
- the fight against the imperialists, the militarists and the land- 
lords, gradually arming itself with t& weapons it captured 
from the enemy, repelling the superior forces of the Kuo- 
mintang counter-revolution and of the imperialists with. ex- 
ceptional heroism, it managed to build up a Red Army which 
today is a big factor in the. international revolution. 
Having set up a Soviet government, and having proved 
to the workers and peasants of China, and of the whole 
colonial East, that it is possible to fight victoriously against 
the imperialists and landlord reaction, the Communist Party 
of China not only strengthened its positions among the broad 
masses in the Soviet regions, but also disintegrated the rear 
of the enemy. Thanks to this, the Red Army, led by the 
Chinese Communists, repelled all the five Kuomintang cam- 
paigns against it, and emerged from each campaign stronger 
than it had been before. It  is now heroically repelling the 
sixth campaign, insthe organization of which the biggest im- 
perialist powkrs are taking part. The ~ e d  Army is improv- 
ing the fighting qualities of its units, and is paralyzing the 
monstrous military machine which Chiang Kai-shek has built 
for the purpose of eradicating Communism from China. 
The successes the Communist Paxty of China has achieved 
in the midst of war and revolution should serve as an ex 
ample to all other Communist Parties, particularly at 
present time when we have come right up to a new round 
revolutions and wars, when the application of the Leninist 
A 
line in war and revolution becomes the central task of every 
section of the K;ornmunist International. 
c) Finally, the Communist Party of Japan. 
In Japan, where the whole bourgeoisie, the whole press 
and all the parties are shouting that, without Manchuria and 
expansion on the continent of Asia, Japan will suffocate, 
where the Social-Democratic parties speak with exceptional 
cynicism about the civilizing role of *Japan in Asia, where 
day after day it is dinned into the minds of the masses that 
Japan is invincible since she has never suffered defeat in 
--it has been particularly difficult for the small Com- 
munist Party ta raise the question of the defeat of the father- 
land and the transformation of the imperialist war into civil 
-war. Nevertheless, it did this. I t  boldly and determinedly 
went against the stream. . It not only put forward correct 
slogans, but carries them right among the masses, penetrates 
everywhere where there are workers and peasants, and comes 
out in opposition to the war and in defense of China. 
The examples quoted give us grounds for saying that the 
question of the fight against war has been properly put in 
these sections of the Communist International. By this I do 
not want to suggest that all the Communist Parties have in 
the past period properly agitated against war, sufficiently 
mobilized the masses for the purpose of combating it, and 
in particular, have done all that is necessary to prevent 
the shipment of munitions to Japan and to defend the Chi- 
nese Revolution. Only after all these weaknesses have been 
overcome, when mass work, concerning which I shall speak 
later, has been properly organized, will the sections oP the 
Communist International be able at the decisive moment to 
fight properly against war and for transforming the impe- 
rialist war into civil war. 
d) The revolutionary workers and the bourgeoisie of all 
countries know now that the Communist Pa* alone cham- 
pions the interests of the working class and it alone is cap- 
able of organizing it for the struggle against the bourgeoisie. 
That is why the bourgeoisie is driving the Communist Party 
underground. 
e) The Communist Parties are pursuing the uniform line 
of the Communist Intemational. The Communist Interna- 
tional is united by the Executive Committee of the Cornin- 
tern into a single, world, centralized party, which the Second 
International never had and never will have. 
f )  The Communist Parties are inonolithic parties and not 
a "bloc of trends." In these parties there are neither factions 
nor groups as there are in 'the Second International. The 
Communist Parties are waging a tireless and successful strug- 
gle on two fronts; against opportunism and against "Left" 
sectarianism. 
g) And what about our cadres? Our cadres display self- 
sacrifice in the struggle. This applies to the legal Parties 
in the w - d e d  democratic countries, and there this is of 
great significance, because the times have passed when it was 
possible to demonstrate or strike without being arrested or 
shot; but this applies particularly to the illegal parties. 
In Bulgaria, Poland, Japan, China and other countries, 
where every Communist who falls in@ the hands of the 
class enemy is beaten up, subjected to torture, is sentenced 
to long terms of severe imprisonment, the majority of the 
Communists do not cease to be Communists, and do. not 
. cease their struggle even in prison. On leaving prison, the 
majority of them immediately take up their work again. 
Or take Germany. Even in China and Japan, where 
Chiang Kai-shek and the Arakis know how to torture and 
exterminate revolutionary workers, we have not witnessed 
such torture and cruelty and such a mass extermination of 
captured revolutionary workers as we have witnessed in 
Germany. In ' fascist Germany on various pretexts, after 
trial and without trial, everyone who is suspected of belong- 
ing to the ranks of the Communist Party is tortured and 
killed. The dead are silent. . But there is already a literature 
based on the statements of those who have managed to es- 
cape from the concentration camps after unprecedented tor- 
ments. These unprecedentedly cruel and refined tortures of 
' the fascist executioners are intended physically to extermi- 
nate or break the spirit of the Communists. Has it suc- 
ceeded? Those Party workers who have escaped from the 
camps display indomitable readiness to take up their work 
again immediately. 
We have Party workers with whom we y n  go through 
fire and water. What* then is it that is so often lacking? 
They are not always able to carry on systematic, practical, 
mass work properly. 
III. The Spheres in Which the Communists 
Have Not Fulfilled Their Tasks 
In passing now to what in my opinion is an important 
question, I must utter a warning. Naturally, I shall speak 
principally about defects and mistakes. That does not mean, 
however, that our sections have not achieved positive suc- 
cesses in this work during the past year. 
But in the first place, the comrades who spoke before me 
dealt mainly with their achievements and, in all probability, 
those who speak after me will also do the same. (Laughter.) 
Secondly, it is necessary to analyze the mistakes that are be- 
ing committed in order that they shall not be repeated. More- 
over, attention must be concentrated on defects in order to 
learn the lessons they teach and achieve greater successes 
than those which the sections of the Communist Interna- 
tional have achieved in the period between the Twelfth and 
Thirteenth Plenums. 
What have the Communist Parties and the revolutionary 
trade unions failed to carry out in regard to what is required 
in the present situation? Again and ag$in it must be em- 
phasized that the Communist Parties, the Red trade unions 
and the revolutionary trade union opposition have not yet 
learned to carry on mass work well, to agitate and to con- 
solidate the influence they acquire in their everyday work. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Socialist parties and the 
reformist trade unions in all countries are taking part in the 
growing political and economic offensive against the work- 
ing class (the fascization of the state apparatus and the a g  
plication of fascist methods of violence, the continued sharp 
reduction of nominal and real wages, the furious increase in 
the intensification of labor, the cutting down of d l  foms  
of unemployment relief and the line taken for the complete 
abolition of unemployment insurance, compulsory labor, 
etc.), the Communist Parties a d  tho r c v o l ~ t k y  trade 
u~ionr have twt sclfficiently lliberoted thea m s e s  of the 
workers from the influence of the Socid-Democratic parties 
and of the trade unwn bureaucrats. 
The number of workers and unemployed who are dis- 
illusioned with the policy of the reformists is increasing, and 
this is due to no small degree to the work of the Communist 
Parties and of the revolutionary trade unions. But the work- 
ers who left the Social-Democratic parties and the reformist 
trade unions have not, in the mass, come over to the Com- 
munist Parties; they either joined the fascists (Germany, 
Cz&Slovakia, Austria), or the Consematives and Na- 
t i 4  Laborites (England during the last election), or else 
remained outside of all parties. Moreover, the Communist 
Parties, the revolutionary trade unions and the unemployed 
organizations have not managed to enlist and retain in their 
ranks the masses of the workers who follow their lead 
(Germany, before Hitler came to power ; England and Amer- 
ica, during the big unemployed movements and strikes). 
At the same time another dangerous phenomenon is ob- 
served; undsr the h f2wnce~  of adzra~hg fascism, the ap- 
proach of ca# a d  the sharp wors&ng of their conditions, 
the masses of the workers in the so-cdled democratic couk 
trk4 ar o remit of the f d t y  work of the Commicnist Par- 
tie$# the rsordutiowy trade u&ns and the revolurionwy 
mas wgu&ations, are crgain throwing hmse lves  into the 
~ n s  of t h g  s o c ~ f a c c i s ~ .  Thus, during the municipal elec- 
tions in England, the Labor Party gained 292 seats at the 
expense of the Conservatives and the National Laborites., 
In the parliamentary elections in Norway, the Labor Party 
obtained 69 seats. In the cantonal elections in Geneva, the 
Social-Democratic Party obtained q6 per cent of the total 
number of votes -cast ; and yet in French Switzerland the 
workers, in the beginning 68 this year, engaged in massbat- 
tles during which Communists were killed. The workers are 
also joining the reactiokry trade unions (the American 
Federation of Labor increased its membership by 500,ooo). 
At a time when the world situation is approaching right 
up to the second round of revolutions and wars, it is parti- 
cularly important for the Communist Parties to understand 
why their influence on the broad masses of the workers is 
weak, and why considerable numbers of workers still fol- 
low the Social-Democratic parties and the reformist trade 
unions. I shall try, by comparing the situation in several 
Social-Democratic parties and Communist Parties, and also 
by comparing the work of the reformist trade unions with 
that of the Red trade unions in the same industries, to in- 
dicate some of the reasons why the Communist Parties and 
the revolutionary trade unions are lagging behind. 
A. THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE S0C;IALIST PARTY 
OF FRANCE 
I .  A ~ e w *  Figures on the Commma'st Party and the 
Sodist Pwty 
I shall quote a few figures on the membership of the 
Communist Party and the Socialist Party of ~ r a & e  (ac- 
cording to the official returns of these parties) : 
Members 
Year Socklist Party Communist Party 
1920 (at the time of the split) 179,800 ...... 
........ 1921 (after the split) 50450 110,000 
I931 ...................... 130,900 29415 
1932 ...................... 13'7,700 32- 
The fluctuation of membership from 1924 to 1932: The 
Socialist Party of France made 292,700 new members and 
lost 186,415 members. Hence, 106,285 members remained. 
In the same period the Communist Party lost more members 
than it made. 
Take the central organs of the respective parties: Le 
Popukrire and Y H u ~ n i t e .  At the time of the split in 1920, 
the average circulation of YHumanite was 140,000 per day; 
\ 
in 1ga7 the average circulation reached 172,000 per day. ; 
L'Humnite has hardly any regular subscribers. In I ~ W ,  
Le Pop~laire had an average of 18,236 subscribers and 
29,700 daily street sales. In 1932, the average number of 
subscribers rose to 43,000 and daily street sales to 75,000. 
In the same year the average daily circulation of Z'H~manite 
dropped to 113,068. The sales of Z'Humonite are dropping, 
the sales of Le Popwhire are rising. The average daily sales 
of Y H u w i t e  in Paris were: in 1gz1-f7,ooo, in 198- 
45,000, in 1932 ( fourth quarter)-z7,2gg. 
Now take the parliamentary elections. In 1928 the So- 
cialists obtained 1,698,084 votes ; the Communists obtained 
I ,063,gCj3 votes. In 1932 the Socialists obtained I ,964,084 
votes and the Communists-795,630 votes. 
2. The Unitary a ~ d  Reformist Trade Unions 
We now come to the trade unions, and we get the follow- 
ing figures: In 1923 the unitary trade unions* had a mem- 
bership of 39.1.137 members; in 1926 they had 464,836 
members and in 1933 (on August I)-m,o88. If we take 
the four federations separately, the builders, textile work- 
ers, metallists and miners, we get the following: in ~ g q ,  
these had a total membership of 1~ ,8o0 ,  and in 1g3a the 
* The unions A i a t e d  to the revolutionary Unitary Confederation of 
Labor as distinct from the ref ormist Confederation of Labor.-Ed. 
membership was -77,100. We lost 107,700 members during 
this period. Of the unitary trade unions, only the railway- 
men's and civil servants' unions are more or less stable ; they 
lost only 3,000 members in this period. On the other hand, 
at the time of the split in the trade union movement in 
France, the reformist unions had about 400,000 members, 
now, according to what the reformist leaders say, and they 
are no doubt exaggerating, they have about 800,0oo, that 
is to say they have doubled their membership. 
This growth of the Socialist Party and of the reformist 
trade unions is taking place amidst the general worsening of 
the conditions of the working class in France and the direct 
participation of the Socialists and the trade union bureau- 
crats in the government's offensive against the standard of 
living of the workers. It is sufficient to quote a few figures 
showing the drop in wages and the cuts in unemployed relief 
to become convinced that even in France, where this year a 
relatively steady increase in output in certain, branches of 
industry has been observed, wages and the number of work- 
ers  employed have continued to decline. 
a)  In the metallurgical works in Rombas wages have 
dropped 280 to 350 francs per month, compared with 1931, 
and in the works at Knutange they have .dropped 300 to 
400 francs per months. Wages in the textile industry have 
dropped 15 to 20 per cent. Simultaneously with the wage 
cuts, bonuses have t+n abolished, family allowances have 
been reduced, machines have to be cleaned without pay after 
working hours, and an extensive system of fines has been 
introduced, etc., etc. 
b) In normal times, the total number of workers employed 
in industry, according to the figures of the Unitary Confede- 
ration of Labor, is 7,500,000. On October I, 1933, the num- 
ber of totally unemployed was 1,282,000 and the number of 
partially unemployed was 2,820,000. The percentage of the 
various industries is as follows : miner-o per cent unem- 
ployed, metal workers-30. I per cent, chemical workers- 
21.5 per cent, etc. 
c) Unemployed relief is paid to 232,880 unemployed 
workers, at an average of 10 francs per day. 
How is it to be explained that, in spite of their treacherous . 
policy, the Socialist Party and the reformist trade unions are 
growing, whereas the Communist Party of France .and the 
unitary trade unions, which fight for the interests of .the. 
working class, are losing members, losing votes and losing 
readers of their press? I t  can only be explained by the fact 
that the Communist Party of France and the unitary trade 
unions are working badly, and above all, badly carry on mass 
work. Let us examine a few concrete examples. 
The treachery of - the Socialists and the leaders of the 
Confederation of Zabor. When the Sick Insurance Bill was 
being passed' through the French Chamber, the Socialists 
and the leaders of the reformist trade unions voted in favor 
of compelling the workers to pay contributions. The first 
time these contributions were deducted from wages, I 50,000 
workers spontaneously stopped work and demanded : "Give 
us' O& ten sous." The Socialists and the Confederation of 
Labor sabotaged this strike. 
It was the sodalists and the trade union leaders who 
drafted the clause in the Bill to cut dawn state and admini- 
strative expenditure, which saved the government 320,000,- 
oa, francs at the .expense of the salaries of civil servants. 
They voted in favor of reducing the budget by ~OO,OOO,OOO 
francs, by reducing bonuses and subsidies to civil servants 
and workers. They voted for the budget that included ex- 
penditure on armaments,. expenditure on the colonies, ex- 
penditure on the police, on the secret setvice, etc. 
The Socialists and the trade union bureaucrats system- 
atically betrayed strikes. Thus, in the summer of 1931, they 
betrayed a big strike of textile workers in the North, in 
which 125,000 workers were involved, and they concluded an 
agreement with the employers which provided for a reduc- 
tion of wages. In 1933, they betrayed a strike of m,ooo 
workers in Strassburg. 
It  is well known that the leaders of the reformist trade 
unions openly take part in the work of the state institutions. 
of the bourgeoisie. Thus, Jouhaux and other secretaries of 
the Confederation of Labor, are members of the Supreme 
National Economic Council, an organ of the government; 
they are members of the organs of the League of Nations, 
etc. The Socialists and the trade union bureaucrats ;tctually 
take paxt in the work of fascizing the state apparatus and in 
the preparations for imperialist war. These facts provide 
the Communist Party and the revolutionary trade unions 
with numerous opportunities for exposing the leaders of the 
Socialist Party and of the Confederation of Labor ; but full 
advantage is not taken of these opportunities. 
In the North of France, in the very district where,. as I 
have said, the reformists betrayed the textile strike,' the 
number of trade union dues stamps issued between July I, 
1931, and June 30, 1933, has not diminished in comparison 
with the period 1927-29, and the reformist trade union social 
insurance society, Le Travd, even increased its membership 
during these two years by 20,000. And it must be borne 
in mind that the bulk of the workers in the North of France 
&e textile workers. 
Could such a position have arisen had the Communist 
Party and the Unitary Confederation of Labor exposed to 
the broad masses of the workers the strike-breaking tactics 
of the reformists during the textile strike and the other 
treacherous acts of the Socialist Party and, of the reformist 
trade union bureaucrats ? 
I shall give you a concrete example of faulty work on 
the part of the Unitary Metal Workers' Union in Lyons. 
Before the economic crisis, about 20,000 metal workers were 
< .  
employed in Lyons. In 1p8 the Unitary Metal Workers' 
Union had a membership of I ,500, and had contacts with a 
considerable number of factories. During the past years, . 
however, it lost these contacts, because it did not carry on 
any systematic' work and did not even fight against wage 
cuts. The mutual Aid Fund organized by the unitary trade 
union was Gtu red  by the Trotskyists. The trade union also 
had an unemployed relief fund, but it was allowed to fall to 
pieces, and has not beea restored during the crisis. The 
same thing happened to its legal advice bureau. 
In I@, while the reformists were concluding a collective 
agreement with the employers, the unitary trade union devel- 
oped a campaign exposing and explaining the policy of the 
reformists. Now, however, the agreement concluded by the 
reformists with the employers is not known to the workers, 
and it is not exposed by the unitary trade union. Many 
cases of wage cuts have occurred, but the trade union waged 1 
4 no campaign against that. As a result of this deterioration 
in the work, the membership of the trade union has declined I 
from 1,500 to 300. The rebrmists, however, who had 
hardly any influence before, now have a stronger trade union + 
than ours, with 400 members. 
This is not the only example of the work of the unitary 
trade unions. 
What is the position of the revolutionary trade union op- 
position in the Confederation of Labor? Although the I 
unitary trade unions achieved certain successes and enlarged 4 
their contacts with the reformist and unorganized workers 
by means of demonstrations, meetings, etc., they did not 
carry on any systematic work inside the reformist trade 
unions, and are not doing so now. In the campaigns con- 
nected with the preparations for the congresses of the Con- 
federation of Labor and the Unitary G n f  ederation of 
Labor, we criticized the activity of the former, but neither 
the revolutionary trade union opposition groups nor our 
sympathizers in the Confederation of Labor unions ex- 
pressed such criticism. The result oP this weakness in the 
work of the revolutionary trade union oppositions was 
that not a single real delegation from the reformist trade 
unions attended the congress of the Unitary Confederation 
of Labor. And yet an opposition does exist in the Con- 
federation of Labor (opposition speeches at the latter's con- 
gress, the withdrawal of moral support from the Con f edera- 
tion of Labor by the reformist Gas Workers' Union in 
Landes, the expulsion of several opposition branches of trade 
unions from the Confederation, for example, the Builders' 
Union in Dijon, several miners' delegates, etc.). But neither 
the Communist Party of *France nor the unitary trade unions 
have any connection with this opposition. This shows that 
no work is yet being carried on in the reformist trade unions 
either by the unitary trade unions or by the Communist 
Party of France. 
But even in those cases where the unitary trade unions 
enjoy considerable influence they are unable to consolidate 
this influence by organizing their sympathizers. Take for 
example, the Unitary Miners' Union in Calais. ~ h a n k s  to 
an improvement in its mass work, this union achieved con- 
siderable successes recently, about which I shall speak in 
greater detail later. We are interested now in another aspect 
of this work, viz., the continued weakness in the consolida- 
tion ,of our influence in the pits. In pit No. 3 in Kurner, 
the unitary trade union .put up a candidate for the position 
of miners' agent who received IOI votes, and he was elected. 
In this pit there are only four members of the Unitary Min- 
ers' Union. In the Labourse pit, the &didate of the unitary 
trade union for the position of minus' agent was elected by , 
a vote of 32% but the union has only six members in that pit. - 
In St. Angoil, the unitary trade union has only ten members, 1 
and yet its candidate was elected by a vote of 471. The re- .I 
formist candidate obtained 60 votes, although the re- , 
formist trade union has 50 members. The results of the 
$ d o n s  leave no doubt that the unitary trade union has i 
c o n + d d l e  influence in these pits, but it is unable to recruit . 
ot retain new members. The growth of the iduence of the 
trade anion is not acc-panied by the growth of its organi- 
zation and by its organizational consolidation. 
And-yet the position is such that all that is required is that 
the unitary trade union should exert a little effort for the 
work to produce good organizational results. The work 
of the members of the unitary trade union among the cloth- 
ing workers of Lyons goes to prove this. The reformist 
'Clothing Workers' Union, which is very strong in Lyons, 
agreed to a 30 per cent wage reduction on the pretext that 
prices had dropped. The unitary trade union, in spite of its 
weakness (only one member of this union put up a real 
&$at)# with the aid of the district council of the Unitary ! 
Uattting Workers' Union, called d n g s  and distributed . 
Iwfkts, and thus roused all the workers, men and women. 
When the wage cut was declared, the indignation among the ' 
~~ was so strong that at a number oP factories the - 
maehiges were stopped. The employers, fearing a strike . 
throughout the whole clothing industry, were compelled to 
withdraw the wage cut. As a result of this victory, the 
Unitary Clothing Workers' Union became much stronger, 1 . 
and four trade union branches were formed in the factories. 
The influence of the refotmists considembly declined. 
& I have already stated, ,the Unitary Miners' Union in 
Calais recently achieved cbiderable . successes. The num- 
ber of branches has increased as compared with 1932. In 
twelve branches, 329 new members were made, and in eight 
branches, I 17 members were 'lost. This success can be 
ascribed to. the improvement in the methods of work; for 
example, the union began to publish a monthly paper, The 
M i d s  Voice. When they started this paper they had not a 
sou, but the sales of the first issue (6,300 copies were pub- 
lished) brought in sufficient funds for publishing the seamd 
issue (7,000 copies), and at the present time the paper is 
being run without a loss. In addition to 'the publication of 
this paper, mention must also be made of the good work 
carried on by various branches and individual members, 
which has produced definite results. Take for example the 
branch in pit NO. 3 in Lievin. This branch was formed in 
I 93 I, ' and consisted of zo members ; in the middle OF 1933 
it had 240 members. This result was achieved by the regular 
calling of meetings, the discussion of the tasks ahead, the 
enlisting of all the members in trade union work, the proper 
distribution of functions, etc. There can be no doubt that 
the proper organization of' mass work by the other &tary 
trade unions. would produce the same positive results. Hence, 
it is up to the Communists aod the revolutionary trade union 
workers. 
3. The Demagogy and Maneuvers of the ~ o c i a l k t ;  and 
Trods UtlMn Bweawritts, and the Mistakes of the 
Communist Party a d  the Unitary Confedem- 
twn of Lobw of Frame 
The united front. The Central Committee of the Com- 
munist Party of France committed serious opportunist er- 
rors at the end of 1932 and the beginning of 1933 in carry- 
ing out the united front. For three months the leading 
body of the French Communist Party carried on negotiations 
with the Socialist Party concerning the terms of a debate 
that was to be organized on the question of unity generally. 
Accepting one after another the terms demanded by the 
Socialist Party, including "the mutual obligation to abstain 
from accusations and insults," and "equal number of invi- 
tation tickets," etc., they eventually came to an agreement 
that the :'meetings must bear the character of mutual re- 
spect and discipline." 
The mistake the Political Bureau of the Central Corn- 
mittee of the Communist Party of *France made was not 
of course that it carried on negotiations with the Central 
Committee of the Socialist Party, although it is difficult 
to understand why they should qegotiate with P.U.P.'ists,* 
with renegades and people who have been expelled horn the 
Communist Party, who represent nobody. Their mistake 
was that they failed to carry on negotiations for the organi- 
zation of a united front of struggle between the Communist 
and Socialist workers on definite and on a definite 
program ; instead they discussed the organization sf a debate 
on questions concerning the united front. These negotiations 
were carried on in the following manner: the Communist 
Party called a meeting on the united front, to which they 
invited the Socialist leaders. That was the proper thing to 
do. That meeting was very successful; but owing to the 
opening of negotiations, no further meetings of this kind 
* Partie dd'Un&e &oletar&. Party of Proletarian Unity-a small 
group of opportunists who were expelled from the Communist Party 
in 1929.-Ed. 
were called. Had the Communist Party continued to call 
such meetings on the united front then, in view of the inter- 
est displayed by the workers in a united front of struggle, 
the success o l  the Communist Party of France would have 
been assured, as is proved by the anti-war campaign which 
the Party carried on in a skillful manner. This campaign 
met with a very fine response not only among the nonoparty 
workers, but also among the members of the Socialist Party 
(122 branches of the Socialist Party a i a t e d  to the Am- 
sterdam anti-war movement). 
The Socialist Party, which began by intimidating its m a -  
bers who took part in the anti-war movement, had to change 
its tactics, because threats of expulsion had no effect. It 
commenced negotiations with the Communists not for the or- 
ganization of a united front of joint struggle-of course 
the Socialist Party does not want such a united front-but 
about the terms of organizing a debate on the united front. 
Its purpose was to put a stop to the process of disintegra: 
tion in its ranks. And thanks to the mistakes committed 
by the Central Committee of' the Communist Party of 
France, the Socialist Party succeeded in its object. 
Then began a series of joint conferences, communiques, 
etc., about trifling matters. And this created the illusion 
among the Socialist workers that real unity was beink dis- 
cussed. The interest displayed by the workers in these nego- 
tiations was enormous. Outside the hall where these 
negotiations were going on hundreds of workers gathered. 
Having started these negotiations, the representatives of the 
Communist Party should have tried to transform them into 
negotiations for a real uoited front of struggle on a definite 
platform and in this way expose the representatives of the 
Socialist Party, because the latter's aim, of course, was some- 
thing entirely different. The members of the Socialist Party 
who were disappointed with their party were already on the 
road to the Communist Party. But owing to the fact that 
the latter had entered into these negotiations for "unity" 
with the Socialist Party, they thought to themselves: well, 
the Socialist Parti is not so bad after ill, why should we 
leave it? Perhaps the two parties will unite. 
These negotiations for the organization of a debate on 
the "scientific" significance of the unity of the working class 
' were brought to an end only by the intervention of the 
E.CC.1. As is well known, in the beginning of March, the 
Central Committee of the Socialist Party rejected the pro- 
@ of the Communist Party of France to establish a united 
fknt of struggle on a definite platform, and left no doubt 
whatever that these negotiations for a debate wen simply a 
maneuver on its part. As far as I know, the Communist 
Party called no further meetings far a united front after the 
cessation of the negotiations. e 
-The campaign for the united front was not carried on any 
better by the unitary trade unions. Take, for example, the 
tactics of the Unitary Confederation of Labor on the ques- 
tion of organizing a united front of struggle of the munici- 
pal workers and office employees against the sweeping attack 
upon. their wages that the government was preparing. As a 
result of the pressure of the masses, on November 30, 1932, 
the reformist unions in Paris called a big meeting of munici- 
pal employees to protest against the proposed wage cuts. But, 
scarad by the call made to its members by the unitary trade 
unions to attend this meeting, the reformists cancelled itt 
Thus, the unitary union had every opportunity of taking the 
initiative and calling a meeting themselves to atpose the 
reformists and utilize the meeting for the purpose of organ- 
izing a united front oP struggle with the municipal employees 
against the attack on their standard of living. 
But instead of doing this the unitary union came to an 
agreement with the reformists to set up a joint committee 
to convene the meeting, to have an eqrcd number of speakem, 
and to refrain from all verbal criticism. And this was agreed 
to in spite of the fact that the unitary unions in Paris have 
appronimately three times as much influence upon the munici- 
pal employees as the reformists, And Z'Humunite wrote 
that the meeting passed off in fraternal unity and that the 
( 4  pact of non-aggression was very conscientiously observed 
by the unitarians." It is not surprising therefore that Le 
Popddre  wrote that the meeting was one of the best exam- 
ples of the application of the tactics of the united front. 
(Loughte*.) Apparently, 4'Humanite accepted this praise at 
its face value. 
The Unitary Municipal Employees' Union in Dijon went 
even further in its capitulation to the reformists in carrying 
out the united front. In Wjon, the initiative in calling a 
meeting of the municipal employees against the government's 
attack on their wages was taken by the reformist union. Here 
too, the unitary union called upon its members to attend the 
meeting. When the reformist leaders, seeing the temper of 
the meeting, proposed that a joint bureau be set up, and began 
to make "Left" speeches, o w  Comrade Haniman declared 
that he was "glad to note the change of position of the re- 
formist organizations and the speakers who have adopted 
the point of view of exposing the anti-working class char- 
acter of bourgeois parliamentarism and of 'Left' govern- 
ments, which they formerly supported." (Cahiers du Bod 
c h e v k e ,  December I, 1932, p. 1458.) 
And yet, the treacherous policy of the leaders of the Con- 
federation of Labor and OF the Socialist Party could have 
been very strikingly exposed to the masses on the question 
of their attitude to the reduction of the deficit in the budget 
at .the expense of the municipal employees. In the course of 
the year during which the Finance Bill was discussed in the 
Chamber, Jouhaux and his supporters pretended to be 
opposed to the Bill, carried on mysterioqs negotiaiions with 
Boncour and proposed amendments to the Bill which. in 
fact, also provided for economies at the expense of the 
workers and o&e employees amounting to three quarters 
, of a billion francs. As a result of d l  this. the government's 
Bill was passed, and 38,000 municipal employees were dis- 
missed, no new employees were engaged, wage and salary 
cuts.were introduced ranging from 2 to 10 per cent, various 
bonilpes to workers and office employees were reduced by 
a0 per cent, etc. 
Tks Commwaist Party of France and the Berlirr Protocol. 
But since the Communist Party of France displayed such 
faith. in the proposals of the leaders of the Socialist .Party 
to negotiate the terms of a debate on the united front, and 
since the leaders of the unitary trade unions got so enthu- 
siastic about the loud-mouthed "Left" phrases of the re- 
formists, it is not surprising that the Communist Party and 
the unitary trade unions were so helpless in exposing the 
furious campaign and . the demagogy which the Socialists 
and reformists developed in connection with the prolonga- 
tion of the Berlin agreement between the U.S.S.R. and 
Germany. 
Fulfilling the direct orders of French imperialism, Rosen- 
feld began to pretend that he was a loyal friend of the 
German proletarian revolution and of the German Com- 
munists. Le Popdaire of May 11 commenced a campaign 
against the U.S.S.R. in connection with the signing of the 
Berlin Protocol and hypocritically exclaimed : "The Bol- 
shevik Party is persecuted in Germany as the ~ e r m a n  sec- 
tion of the Communist International, which has its head- 
quarters in Moscow. It is persecuted for displaying the 
Soviet emblem. . . . And this is the very moment the Soviets 
choose to sign.a pact of amity with Hitler. The workers' 
and peasants' government of Russia binds itself with a 
friendly protocol to the executioners of the German work- 
ers." In the same issue of Le Populaire Leon Blum en- 
gages in the same demagogy but addresses himself directly 
to the Communist Party of France. He wrote : "How can 
they" (the French Communists) "explain to the masses of 
the workers the fact that, while their brother party in Ger- 
many has been driven underground by the fascists and while 
their leaders are threatened with death at the hands of Hitler 
and Goering, the Soviet government hastens to sign with 
fascism . . . a pact of confidence and amity." 
Replying to these articles in Le Populuire, I'Humanite, 
66 in its issue of May 22, writes : . . . . I t  would do no harm 
to revert to the question of the ratification of the protocol 
prolonging the German-Soviet treaty concluded in 1926. . . . 
The treaty in question was concluded in Berlin on April a+, 
1926. . . . This is a typical treaty of non-aggression, such as 
the Soviet Union concludes, and such as was concluded, for 
example, by the Soviets with France. I t  was prolonged in 
Moscow on June 24, 1931, but Germany had not yet ex- 
changed ratifications of the prolongation of the treaty' .with 
the U.S.S.R. . . . Hitler did this himself without preliminary 
~iegotiations with the Soviet government. Thus, to the great 
confusion of the falsificators, Blum and Rosenfeld, it was 
Hitler, and not Stalin, who ratified the treaty of 19g6- 
99 31.. . . 
And that is all. In reply to this "argument," Rosenfeld 
. wrote another article in Le Populuire of May 23, in which 
he said: ". . . Let us admit for a moment that this is trut. 
. . . ~ u t '  in that case. how can one explain the comments of 
Imartk a d  Pravda which welcomed this ratification as an 
' 
act of international significance, and congratulated them- 
selves on it. No, l'Humanite must think 06 some other argu- 
ment to pacify its readers who are becoming increasingly 
disturbed about it. . . ." 
' 
To this artide of Rosenfeld, Z'Humanite made no reply 
whatever. 
One must give credit to the French Socialists for their 
ability to maneuver and to develop demagogical agitation; 
whereas the French Communists do not always opportunely 
and ably expose these maneuvers and this demagogy. 
Le Popukrire, Rosenfeld, Blum & Co., as well as the whole 
of the Second .International, were confronted with the task 
of counteracting-by means of sickly sentimental phrases 
about the persecution to which the German Communists are 
being subjected "for displaying the Soviet emblem''-the 
stunning effect that the treachery of the German Social- 
Democratic Party and of the Geman trade unions, before 
and when Hitler came to power, had upon the French work- 
ers, and in fact, upon all workers. To some extent, the So- 
cialists were able to fulfil this task because the oral and 
written agitation of the Communist Party of France and of 
the unitary trade unions failed to refute in a sufficiently in- 
telligible and clear manner the despicable attacks against the 
U.S.S.R. More than that, this agitation did not even expose . 
the French Sqcialists and the Socialists of other countries, 
who either themselves have shot down workers and peasants 
in their own countries and particularly in the colonies,, or 
have supported the bourgeois governments in suppressing 
the toilers, Did not the French Sodalists vote money, and 
are they not now voting money, to the French government 
for the sanguinary suppression of the people in Morocco, 
Syria and Indo-China, who are rising against the yoke of 
Piench imperialism ? Did not Blurn & G., who are so "in- 
dignant" about the Berlin protocol, support the French gov- 
ernment when it signed the Four-Power Pact to which fas- 
cist Germany belongs? .Did the French Socialists ever pro- 
test against the fact that their government is in alliance with 
the Polish, Rumanian and Jugoslav fascist governments 
which are shooting down starving workers and peasants, 
and who are torturing and physically destroying political 
prisoners in their dungeons? Attention should have been 
called to these and other facts of the treacherous practice 
of the French Socialists. 
The French proletarians, whom the Blurns try to fool with 
sentimental phrases, should have been reminded of the policy 
of tears and blood pursued in the interests of their bour- 
geoisie, and against the toilers now and in the past by the 
parties of the Second International when in power. Did not 
the "Labor" government of MacDonald ruthlessly shoot 
down the workers and peasants of India and of other colo- 
nies who rose against the intolerable yoke of the predatory 
imperialists? Did it not destroy whole villages with fire and 
sword ? Did not the Social-Democratic police presidents of 
Berlin and Altona shoot down workers' demonstrations, par- 
ticularly the May First. demonstration in Berlin in '193, 
* 
andrthe demonstration in Altona in July, 1932? Did not the 
fascists execute Comrade' Luetgens and three other Com- 
munist workers who were arrested at this Altona demon- 
stration by the Social-Democratic police president because 
of their anti-fascist work? 
The French Communists must tirelessly and persistently 
remind the workers of the whole truth about the treachery 
of the social-fascists. This would suppress all desire on the 
part of the French Socialists to try to hound the toilers 
against the u.s.s.R.' by means of campaigns of slander; and 
it would help the broad masses of the workers to understand 
the real motives of these campaigns. 
. Now a few words about. the Berlin Protocol. 
Should the U.S.S.R., which is the o n l ~  country as yet in 
which the proletarian revolution ' has- conquered, and which 
is, in the words of Lenin. "as yet an oasis amidst a seething 
sea of imperialist piracy" (Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 
XX'III, "Speech in ~ 6 r e i ~ n  Policy," May 14, 1g18), reject 
'.the possibility of temporary agreements with capitalist states 
in the sphere of industry and commerce, and, if it is possible, 
in the sphere of diplomatic relations ? Should the U.S.S.R. 
take advantage of thd discord among the imperialist states 
in order to hinder their coming to an agreement against the 
first, and so far, the only land of the proletarian dictatorship, 
or as far as possible to make such agreement temporarily 
impossible? No honest worker can have the slightest doubt 
that it is the bounden duty of the Soviet Union to take ad- 
vantage of these antagonisms to strengthen the Soviet Union. 
Such agreemehis, said Comrade Stalin, in his "Interview 
with the First American Delegation," "are possible and expi- 
dient in conditions of peaceful development . . . The limits 
to the& agreements? The limits are set by the opposite char- 
* acters of two systems between which there is rivalry and 
conflict. Within the limits permitted by these two s y s p s ,  
but only within those limits, agreement is quite possi61e." 
(Stdin, L e d ~ k ,  Vol I.) 
. It is true, there were so-called "revolutionaries" in 1918 
who urged that the land of the proletarian dictaforship 
should not enter into any agreement with capitalist states. 
As is well known, their point of view was rejected ; the adop- 
tion of this point of view w d d  merely have helped the im- 
perialists and their accomplices, the Social-Democrats of all 
countries, who would have shouted that the Sovet Union 
itself was to blame, because it isolated itself from the whole 
world; it would have helped them in their further pursuit of 
the policy of blockade and intervention against the Soviets. 
Indeed, in the very first days of its existence, the Soviet gov- 
ernment appealed to the people and governments of all coun- 
tries to stop the war and establish normal diplomatic and 
trade relations with the land of the proletarian dictatorship. 
Life has fully confirmed the correctness of these tactics from 
the standpoint of consolidating the Soviet state and develop- 
ing the international proletarian revolution. Perhaps, in en- 
tering into such agreements with capitalist states, the 
U.S.S.R. should have been guided by the form of the bour- 
geois dictatorship"democratic" or fascist--existing in the 
respective countries, and should establish normal diplomatic 
and trade relations with "democratic" France; iay, and break 
off the relations with Germany, because she became a fascist 
state; or should refuse to conclude agreements with China, 
Janan, etc., because the bourgeoisie and landlords in these 
countries oppress and exploit the workers and peasants by 
feudal and fascist methods? The broad masses of the work- 
ers will have no doubts in their minds on this question if the 
Communists prove to them by facts that "democratic" Eng- 
land or France employ the same methods of colonial enslave- 
ment of the peoples of India or Indo-China as the Japanese 
employ in China, Korea or Formosa; that in all the capitalist 
countries, irrespective of their form of government, the pre- 
dztory exploitation of the workers is growing, the ruination 
of the bulk of the peasantry is increasing. and the peasants 
are being driven from the land because of their failure to 
pay their debts. This. of course. does not mean that it is a 
matter of indifference to the Communists, from the point of 
view of mobilizing the forces of the proletariat and of de: 
veloping the revolutionary struggle, whether the "demo- 
cratic" or the fascist form of dictatorship exists in the &en 
capitalist country. But this is not what we mean when we 
speak of the establishment of relations between the prole- 
tarian state and the capitalist world. From the point of view 
of these relations, all capitalist countries are alike. All these 
countries are governed by the bourgeoisie, which, according 
to the prevailing circumstances, exercises its dictatorship 
.either in the form of ''democracy," or in the f o m  of fascism. 
But the social-scoundrels shout : 'The Soviet government 
3 concluding pacts of non-aggression with capitalist states, 
including fascist states ! It gives a hearty welcome to states- 
men fnnn the capitalist countries l . . ." The best reply to 
sneh, and similar, demagogic outcries by the social-fascists 
did renegades is to explain to the workers the principles un- 
derlying the foreign policy of the Soviet -government : 
a)' The ~ & e t  government does not intend to attack other 
c~untries, for it is, in principle, irreconcilably opposed to the 
enslavement of one state by another, of one nation by 
another. 
b) The Soviet Union rejects and fights against imperialist 
war, which is waged in the interests oP a handful of capital- 
ists and causes the physical extermination of millions of 
workers and peasants. 
, c) .For the first time in the history of humanity two 
worlds, two systems, two irreconcilable types of state, con- 
f r ~ n t  one another. 
In tke old capitalist world there is economic decay and 
&hPsF, tk growth of parasitism, the growth of exploits- , 
tion. :sf ~ n & ~ l o ~ m e n t .  ruin. poverty, starvation and the 
despair of the toilers. 
In &e'Sovigt Union. in the land of victorious socialism, 
fiere is a rate of development of  productive forces unpre- 
edented in history. a gigantic growth of industrialization 
and the victor); of the collective farm system, the ZQuidah 
of classes and of the causes which give r S e  to the explaita- 
tion of mon by man in my form, 
The abolition of unemployment and the systematic im- 
provement of the material and cultural standards of the 
toilers have been achieved already; the broad masses of the 
workers and collective farmers are conscious builders of a 
new and happy life. 
Is it not dear to the masses of the workers and peasants 
m o f  the whole world that they are immediately interested in 
the prosperity of the Soviet system and in the further vic- 
tories of socialist construction in the Soviet Union? Is it 
not clear to them that it is necessary to defend the socialist 
fatherland of all the toilers? The socialist state points out 
to the workers of all countries and to the oppressed of tho 
whole world, the path of struggle and of victory, and it 
mobilizes the revolutionary forces of the working class of 
all countries against capitalism. 
The bourgeoisie of all countries are seeking a way out 
of the crisis by still further intensifying the exploitation of 
the workers and peasants, by still further oppressing the 
colonies, by still further enslaving the weak countriess' by 
waging civil war against the toilers at home and by imperial-) 
ist war for a new division of the 7iPOrld. 
The bourgeoisie of all countries hate the Soviet Union 
whose successes are mobilizing the forces of the proletariat 
and of all the toilers for the revolutionary way * out of the 
crisis. The imperialists are striving to find a way out' of 
their world of contradictions by means of a counter-revdu- 
tionary war against the Soviet Union. By its c~nsistent 
policy of fighting for peace, and in particular by concluding 
pacts of non-aggression with the bourgeois states, the Soviet 
government is thwarting the plans of the interventionists and 
is  proving to the niasses that it is not the U.S.S.R. that is 
striving and preparing for war. e 
And if the imperialists commence their counter-revolu- 
tionary war against the Soviet Union. it will not be so easy 
for them to deceive the masses by asserting that the Soviet 
4 
' LJnion is responsible for war. 
At the same time it must be explained to the masses of 
the toilers that, while signing pacts of non-aggression, the 
imperialists are not ceasing their preparations for imperial- 
ist war. And every one of the imperialists, under cover of 
these pacts, is simply waiting for the convenient moment to 
unfurl its counter-revolutionary attack against the Soviet 
union, 
The soviet Union done, in the whole of its policy, is really 
wadng a struggle against war. 
Tho French social-scoundrels know d l  this perfectly well. 
They strive to conceal this truth from the French workers 
precisely because they serve their bourgeoisie in all its ma- 
neuvers. When French imperialism (in r ~ )  instigated the 
N r t h  ' Chinese militarists to ' violate their treaty with the 
U.S.S.R. concerning the Chinese-Eastern Railway and when 
the U.S.S.R. put up resistance to this, the French Socialists 
set up a howl about so-called Red imperialism. In 1933 
French imperialism is alarmed by the growing aggressive- 
ness of the German fascists. The French Socialists, pretend- 
ing 'to sympathize with the German Communist Party, de- 
mand the rupture of relations between f ie  U.S.S.R. and 
fapjst Germany. . .  *;,'I' ,:.:. 
Is .it not clear thatthe French Socialists are not defending 
, the principles of proletarian internationalism, as they allege, 
but the jatprests of French i&perialisrn ?. But I'Huw&tds 
reply to Blum & Co- shows that the central organ of the 
Communist Party of France does not fully understand the 
foreign policy of the Soviet government. Similarly YHu- 
rnanite did not satisfactorily explain, not only to the broad 
masses of the workers, but even to the members of the 
Party, the policy the Soviet government pursued in conclud- 
ing an agreement with France. In connection with the wel- 
come given to Herriot during his visit to the U.S.S.R. the 
Socialist press in France raised quite a hullabaloo. Le 
IJopulaire, commenting on the opinions expressed by Soviet 
statesmen concerning the peace policy pursued by Herriot, 
wrote : While the Communists call them, the Socialists, 
traitors for supporting the policy of Herriot, "Moscow 
greets this policy as the dawn of a new era." (Paul Faure, 
in Le Popddre, August 28, 1933.) 
Although l ' i w m n i f e  replied to this “demagogy" in a num- 
ber of fairly good articles (Cachin, ~ c l e a u x ,  Ferrat, Pierre 
and others), nevertheless the policy of the Soviet govern- 
ment was not sufkiently explained, even to the members 
of the Party. This alone can explain why the Montlucon 
District Committee of the 1Comunist Party of Fmce 
passed a resolution on the relations between the Soviet gov- 
ernment and the French government in  which it stated: 
"After a lengthy discussion on the present political situation, the 
danger of war and the relations between the Soviet and F d  
governments, the MOndto1con Diskkt Committee ddares: 
1) That the visits of French statesmen (particularly that of 
~ e r r i o t )  were not sufficiently explained by the Communist Party 
and its press. 
2) That the Socialist leaders, on the basis of their declarations 
(particularly the declaration of Cot on technical co-opeation be- 
tween the air forces of the U.S.S.R. and of France), commenced 
a furious attack against Russia and accused it of preparing for a . 
military alliance with France. 
3) That PHwmzmh and the leaders of the Party did not suffi- 
ciently and opportunely react to this attack, apparently because they 
did not understand the importance of it and the impression it could 
make upon the workers. 
4) That the attack caused dismay even in the Communist ranks 
to d degree that on Sunday,. October 1, at the Youth Congress 
in AUier, one of the members of the Party raised the question of 
the poss'bility of a military alliance between France and Soviet 
Russia. 
Thc District Committee demands . . . a clear explanation from 
tbe leaders of the French Communist Party. . . ." 
The Montlucon District Committee is right. How can the 
members of the Party agitate properly against the Socialists 
if they do not get a proper line fim their Party leaders ? 
Was it difEcult to explain that the U.S.S.R. is pursuing a 
policy of '*e and of frihlly relations with all countries, 
and that that is why the toilers of the Soviet Union were 
pleased that the relations between France and the U.S.S.R. 
have improved? Even before that the U.S.S.R. was in favor 
of restoring nonnal relations with France, as with other 
capitallst' cotltltries, aid so, it was not the position of the 
Soviet Union that had changed, after the coup in Germany, 
but the policy of France towards the U.S.SR. It is well 
known that when imperialist France was not very much 
afraid of Germany (when the Weimar Coalition was at 
the head of Germany) it got Poland, Rumania and Czecho- 
Slovakia to encircie the Soviet Union; it' was the initiator 
of an attack upon the Soviet Union. Then the National- 
Socialists, with their program of equal status for Germany, 
revision of frontiers .and war, came into power. Imperialist 
France had to change its tactics for a time. French im- 
periaism abandoned the role .of chief organizer of the anti- 
Soviet front, signed a pact of non-aggression with the 
U.S.S.R. and demonstrated its friendship with the %Get 
Union. This change of tactics took place precisely because 
the international situation had changed. Tomorrow it may 
change again, and French imperialist circles may try, as the 
Polish imperialist circles are trying, to strike a bargain with 
German fascism. 
Was this difficult to understand, difficult to explain? It 
should ,have been explained to the masses that the Socialists 
are spreading lying rumors about a military alliance between 
the U.S.S.R. and France and about the manufacture of 
munitions for the U.S.S:R. in order to hinder the successful 
work of the Anti-War Committee, the Communist Party of 
France and the Unitary Confederation of Labor, against 
war. They spread this legend about the manuf'a~ture of 
munitions for the U.S.S.R. as a pretext for facilitating the 
unceasing supply of munitions to Japan. The French Com- 
munists have every opportunity of using the whole policy 
of the Soviet Union as an illustration to prove to the work- 
ers concretely that the Soviet Union does not belong to any 
coalition of imperialist states, that in its relations with other 
states it is pursuing an independent, proletarian, class policy, 
in the interests of the toilers of the whole world. 
In Poland, the changed relations between the U.S.S.R. 
and Poland were utilized extensively by the Polish Socialist 
Party against the Communist Party of Poland. Notwith- 
standing the fact that the central Party press properly re- 
plied to the campaign of the Polish Socialist Party and bour- 
geois press, the local Party organizations were r a t k  slow 
in reacting to this campaign. 
Now a campaign has commenced in the United States in 
connection with the recognition of the U.S.S.R. It must be 
observed that there is lack of clarity on this question even 
among the Communists. As I have already said, we must 
deprive the Social-Democrats of their demagogic "argu- 
ments" by explaining our  position in a clear and sensible 
manner. t 
The numerical growth of the Socialist Party of France 
does not mean, however, that its position in the working class 
has been strengthened during the past year. On the contrary, 
the increasingly determined attack of the bourgeoisie on the 
working class-particular1 y the reduction of wages and sal- 
aries of workers and civil servants on the one hand, and the 
growing radicalization of new strata of workers, on the other 
-is compelling the Socialist Party of France to maneuver 
in various directions, and is even leading to a split in its 
ranks. The neo-Socidists, led by Renaudel under the slo- 
9"" : Order, Authority and the ' Nation, are deliberately 
s t r i ~ n g  to excel the fascists in the fascization of the French 
republic. In particular, they are supporting the "Left" gov- 
ernments of France in carrying out the financial plan of the 
bourgeoisie to wipe out the deficit in the budget at the ex- 
pense of the toilers. The majority of the party, led by Blum 
and Faure, are carrying on "Left" maneuvers. They re- 
ject the proposal of the neo-Socialists and are compelled to 
break away from them, which means a split in the Socialist 
parliamentary group, because they fear that otherwise they 
will rapidly lose the confidence of the workers and that the 
Social-Democratic workers will begin to go over to the 
Communists. Under cover of this maneuver, they are in- 
creasing their intimidation of the revolutionary-minded 
workers in their own ranks, and they have expelled the Ac- 
tion-Sdcialist* group for taking part in the Amsterdam anti- 
war movement. 
I 
* ~ e f t - w i n ~  group in the Socialist Party of France.-Ed. 
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4. Improvements in the Work of the Communist Party 
4 France and of the Unitary Confederatwn of Lcabm 
The Communist Party is helping to disintegrate the So- 
cialist Party of. France to a ver)r considerable extent, but it 
. has been unable as yet to. take full advantage of the situa- 
tion. Meetings organized by the Communist Party are at- 
tended by Socialist workers; the future will show whether 
the Party will be able to consolidate for itself this discon- 
tent of the Socialist workers. 
The Communist Party of France has achieved successes, . 
not in many things, but successes nevertheless. The criticism 
of'the Twelfth Plenum was not lost on it. I t  is true that 
the state of the leadership kar not. improved much, but still it 
h.m improved. I n  France we have a definite turn for the 
better in regard to transferring the work oP the trade unions 
to the factories. There are organizations' that have their 
bases in the factories ('Voiron Metdlurgie). At the Citroen 
Works, where before the strike the unitary trade union had 
almost no positions. 17 trade union sections have been or- 
ganized. The Unitary Woodworkers' Union at Lyons has 
I 7 seet&nt3, ~ ~ a n i z d  in factories& two a£.-which fhe.-wx~k-~~~ 
ers a r e  organized .xoo per. cent. On September 16, 1933,~ 
the unitary trade unions had a t d '  of r # h  trade u~imr 
sections and groups in the factories and 400 factory and 
trade union section newspapers (in order to avoid misunder- 
standing I must say that we have not verified these fi@.wues). 
The only thing that is required now is that the work p h d d  
be carried on properly. Some of the trade unions arca&- 
- ginning to acquire; a number of mass auxiliary organs. ,to 
serve the workers. For example the chauffeurs in ihe De- 
partment of the Seine have a legal advice bweaa for 
matters connected with the arbitration courts, an ordinary 
legal advice bureau, a solidarity fund, an insurance fund, a 
sp&s club, a children's holiday camp and a home for aged 
people. The Paris Trade Council has a legal advice bureau 
on matters concerning arbitration, accident and social insur- 
ance, an unemployed insurahce fund, a library, etc. Similar 
organizations have been set up by the Municipal Transport 
Workers' Union in Paris, the d w a y  workers in Amiens 
Langol, the metal workers in St. Etienne and the miners in 
pit No. 5 in Escarpel, etc. 
All this is as yet a drop in the ocean, but they are on the 
right road. They must march forward quickly and the re- 
' sults will soon be perceived. 
a). Mt6muftite is the most powerful agitator the Corn- 
myis t  Party of France possesses. That is why the Central 
Committee should appoint the best Party newspaper workers 
to work on the staff of Z'Humamite. There must be better 
guidance of the paper by the Political Bureau. The impor- 
tant campaigns should be conducted by the paper under the 
direct guidance of the Political Bureau. 
L'Huma~ite, and the other newspapers of the Communist 
Party of France, must reply to the insinuations of the So- 
cialists and of the trade union bureaucrats, not with abuse, 
but with sensi Me explanations. 
b) The Political Bureau-of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of France and the leaders of the unitary 
trade unions should set up special departments to guide the 
oppositional work in the reformist trade unions and other 
mass reformist workers' organizations. 
c) The Central Committee of the Communist Party of. 
France, and the Communist fraction in the Unitary Confed- 
eration of Labor, must take all measures necessary to make 
the unitary trade unions carry on their work in a revolu- . 
tionary manner. They must improve their daily, painstaking 
work in the factories and trade unions, and do it better than 
the reformists. They must make careful preparations for 
strikes, conduct them in a skilful manner, and enlist non- 
Party active workers in the leadership of strikes. 
Strikes and the everyday work of the trade unions must 
be utilized for the purpose of extending the influence of the 
revolutionary trade unions and $or the purpose of consoli- 
dating this influence. The Communist Party of France does 
not utilize the advantage it has in the possession of the uni- 
tary trade unions because the unitary trade unions work 
badly. This must stop. 
d) The Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
France must carry on an extensive, energetic campaign 
throughout the country and call mass workers' meetings, to 
which members of the Socialist Party must unfailingly be in- 
vited, for the purpose of exposing the Socialist Party. The 
speakers at these meetings must be carefully instructed by 
the Party organizations, and special pains must be taken to 
explain the reasons for the split in the Socialist Party, to 
characterize each faction and prove that both factions are in 
agreement in regard to supporting the bourgeois dictator- 
ship, defending the bourgeois fatherland during war, figwng 
against the Communists, etc. 
The Sodalist workers mast be ckled upon to leave both 
factions of the Socialist Party of France and to join the anti- 
fascist and the anti-war organizations, the unitary trade 
unions and the Communist Party. A real united front must 
be established with the l d  organizations afKliated to the 
Action Socidhte, and efforts must be made to get them to 
join the Communist Party of France. 
e) We must agitate better, work better and consolidate 
the fruits of our work in France better. 
B. THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE LABOR PARTY 
IN. NORWAY ;'. J" 
I now pass to Norway where the last elections revealed a- 
colossal increase in the vote of the Labor Party and the 
? p-.* : 
stagnation of our Part~;;.;',;i'$rdj$J!$ $;~,i L,: , r . L,: ci ,,+ i 2;q7j 
I. The State of the N o r k e g i a ~  Lobor Party and the 
Cocrunu~ist Pwty  in Figures 
I shall give only a few figures showing the state and the 
work of the Communist Pa* and. , tk Labor,=,Pa$g, .,in.. 
C .'" ;.'-j$. > ";,:I - . ; - .. 
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Labor Pwty Communist PqSgi : 
n .,- . 
rgzqf (after the spit) 45,000 15,om *- ‘ i s  
1933- 85 9- 5 9279 
Circulation of Newspapers - 
Arbeidrrbladet, in Oslo alone 50,- Total all 8,000 to 
newspapers I O , ~  
. Votes at Parliamentary Elections 
I924 
Labor Party J 799567 
Social-Democratic Party * 85,743 6Qm 
- . Y  , 
- 4 7I-l 7 a -.L2kfi*:4.fi 192~ rLT- .<( 
;<t -; & *; 
' U e d  Zabor Party ** $ . ? p : ~  ?.~#o,OOo 
, ,. - I ib*-m-$gi 1930 
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: 
*  he' Social-Democrats left the Labor Party when the latter =w . 
- -* 
iated to the C.I. 
** The Social-Democratic Party rejoined the Labor Party. 
2. The Position of the Comcmukrt Party in the Trade 
Uwkm Movement 
After the split, the Communist Party of Norway had a 
strong position in the trade unions in the big towns and in 
the important industries. 
In 1927, the Communist Party lost the majority on the 
Trondheim Trades Council and in the Lumber Workers' 
Union, but retained the leadership of the metal workers', 
transport workers', and chemical workers' unions, and in 
a number of small unions. 
In 1930 the Labor Party and the trade union bureaucrats 
split the trade unions in Bergen ; nevertheless, the majority 
of the trade unions in Bergen remained in the hands .of 
the Communists. 
- In view of the fact that the Communist Party failed to 
devote sufficient attention to trade union work, and that the 
Communists working in the trade unions committed many 
opportunist and sectarian mistakes, the trade unions with 
Communist majorities lost their members and the reformist 
. unions grew at their expense. Recently, as a consequence 
of the intensification of the crisis, the worsening of @e con- 
ditions of the working class, and the more and more open 
treachery of the reformists, a certain growth of the influence 
of the revolutionary trade union opposition has been ob- 
served. Discontent in the reforhist unions with the policy 
. of compr&se pursued by the trade union bureaucrats to- 
wards the employers is increasing. At all congresses of trade 
unions, strong oppositions were formed. For example, at 
the Building Workers Congress, out of 202 delegates, the 
Communist opposkion obtained 81 votes on various ques- 
tions. In 1933. the Communists in Oslo secured the election 
of 10 of their delegates to the Trades Council and now they 
have 40 out of 300 delegates. In March, 1933, the Commun- 
ist Party won the leadership in the Paper Makers' Union in 
Ostfolt, the principal center of the paper industry. 
But the Communist Party 05 Norway has failed, so far, 
to make use of its positions in the reformist trade unions, 
in order to : 
a) recruit the workers into the Party; 
b) to increase the circulation of the Party press; 
c )  to turn the diseontent of the manbus of the reform- 
ist trade unions against the Labor Party of Norway. 
This partly explains the r d t s  of the recent parliamen- 
tary elections in which' the Labor Party obtained 125,000 
votes more than it obtained in 1930. In the Ostfolt district 
where the Communist Party has the majority on the Execu- 
tive of the. Trades Council in the town of Sarbsborg, the 
principal ifidustrial center of this region, the Norwegian 
b :b r  Party obtained 21,000 votes and the Communist 
Party, 266 votes. In Oslo, the Labor Party obtained 73,500 
votes and the Communist Party, 1,700 votes. 
The Communist members of trade unions managed more 
or less to take advantage of the discontent of the members 
of the reformist unions to organize an opposition against the 
trade union bureaucrats, but they failed to learn how to 
link up their work in the trade unions with agitation against 
the treacherous Labor Party, which is behind the trade union 
bureaucrats, notwithstanding the fact that it puts forward . 
the demagogic demands for the allocation of 55 ,OOO,OOO 
krone for combating the crisis, and organizes numerous dem- 
onstrations in support of these demands. The Communist 
Party of Norway has been unable to expose Tranmael's 
Labor Party in spite of the fact that it, like all the other 
Social-Democratic parties, says one thing and does another; 
it "says" that it will transform the imperialist war into civil 
war, and yet, when the workers in the Raufe Works (in the 
suburbs of Oslo) tried to prevent the transport of munitions 
to Japan, the Tranmaelists acted as strikebreakers; 
3. How the Nonvegion Commufikt Party Conducts 
Agitation 
a) Ths Unit~ti Front. In an article in the Arbeidsrbladet 
of March IX, 1933, Tranmael wrote: "If one really wants 
to pursue a common line, then one does not start by putting 
forward conditions. Negotiations must be commenced on a 
free basis." In reply to this statement the Arbeiderm, the 
central organ of the Communist Party, in its issue of March 
27, published a second letter addressed to the Central Com- 
mittee of the Norwegian Labor Party in which it says: "We 
must emphasize that our proposal must not be regarded as 
a condition. I t  is merely a proposal which we desire to dis- 
cuss with the representatives of your party, and if in the 
process of the negotiations better proposals be made, we of 
course will be prepared to discuss them and agree to them." 
Thus, the Communist Party of Norway accepted Tran- 
mael's conditions for a united front instead of putting for- 
ward .the definite conditions for a united front with the 
Social-Democratic Party that were published in the mani- 
festo of the Communist International of March 5. I mk, 
and probably you will all agree with me, that these condi- 
tions were obligatory also for the Norwegian section. But 
instead of repelling Tranmael, the Norwegian Communist 
Party, in its answer to him says: We are prepared to dis- 
cuss and accept your proposals. 
In April, 1933, the central organ of the C o e m i s t  Party 
published a resolution passed by the Metal Workers' Union 
in Oslo which reads as follows: "The unity of the workers 
will be possible only when all parties thrm aside their petty, 
party interests and enter into negotiations without consider- 
ation for their factional positions and without any prelkni- 
, nary conditions." The central organ and the Political Bu- 
reau of the Comnlunist Party of N o . m y  expressed their 
complete agreement with this resolution and did not think it 
necessary to make any critical remarks concerning it. 
b) Fm&m. In a number of articles Tranmael declared 
thert in the interests of the working class of 'Norway -the 
Labor Party must take power into its hands. In  reply to 
this a member of the oxeative of the rev~lutionary trade 
union opposition wrote a letter to the central organ of the 
f&mmunist Party in which he said that the Communist Party 
should support the'dmand for the formation of a Social- 
Democratic government with the object of avoiding the fate 
that Melt the working class of Germany under Hitler (Ar- 
bdmen,  -October 27, 1933). and the editors of the eentraf 
organ did not say a single sensible word by way of comment 
on this "argument." 
c )  W h o  is respotwible for the split in the working class? 
In reply to a statement made by Tranmael that, owing to 
thb attacks of the Comintern on the policy of the Second 
Interimtimd, a united working dass is impossible, Gom- 
I& Khstiznsen, secretary of the Communist Party of Nor- 
way, i ~ i  a speech at  the. students' meeting held in Oslo on 
Masdr ~8,1933, said that in the present situation it was no 
use d&ssing who was responsible for the split in the work- 
ing &ass, :the Communists or the Social-Democrats. 
d) Soci&-Dcntocratic Slogans. In connection with, the . 
liberal bourgeois minimum grogram, which the Labor Party 
advanced as the program for a Social-Democratic ,-gov-v- 
ernment, the central organ of the Communist Party, in 
its issue of October 24, 1933, writes : "Nearly half a mil- 
lion adult .workers and small peasants stand for the proud 
slogans of Social-Democracy," "Forward to a free, social- 
'st Norway!" "The whole nation must set to work! And 
we declare that our electors will fulfil their duty if it comes k
to fighting for these slogans." I think that. only conscious 
or unconscious agents of the Labor Party could "agitate" 
against the Labor Party. in this way, 
In the same issue of October 24, 1933, we read the fol- 
lowing profound arguments concerning the character of the 
workers' government which Tranmael has in mind: "The 
crisis and the disintegration of bourgeois society has made 
it absolutely necessary for the bourgeoisie to pursue a re- 
actionary policy that is openly hostile to the wiorking class in 
order to retain their profits and class privileges, and for 
these purposes a workers' government (apparently a Tran- 
maelist government-4.P.) amnot be utilized." That b 
horp'otu party "expos&' the treacherous policy of Social- 
Democracy. 
4. Conclusions 
. a) After such a "struggle" waged by the central organ of 
the Communist Party of ~ 6 r w a ~  gainst the Norwegian 
Labor Party, is it surprising that the workers at the last 
elections almost, entirely voted for the Labor Party ? . 
b) Can the workers understand the irreconcilable dis- 
agreements between the Cokmunists and the social-~emo- 
crats if the central organ of the Communist Party writes 
about the united front in this way? 
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c) With such a policy, and with such work carried on by 
the Communists in the trade unions, is it possible to acquire 
influence among the masses of the workers and consolidate 
it? 
d) The Presidium of the Plenum ought to appoint a com- 
mission to investigate the situation in the leadership of the 
C o m n i s t  Party of Norway; but this does not m&n that 
Chose comrades who brought the Party to this state of isola- 
tion from the masses should be restored. 
C. THE CCXUUXWT PARTY OF CZECHOISLOVAgIA 
I. After the TweIf th Plenum 
At the Twelfth Plenum, the Communist party of Czecho- 
Slovakia was praised for having managed to conduct a num- 
ber a* big strikes and having drawn into these strikes work- 
ers of all trends, including the reformists. But at this very 
Twelfth Plenum it was pointed out that, while organizkg 
and leading these strikes, presumably by applying the tactics 
of the revolutionary united front, the Communist Party of 
~Cz&ho-~Slovakia concealed its Party face. At the time, how- 
ever, this fact was not so completely revealed as it has been 
during the past year. The Cornintern had to point this out 
on several occasions. The Social-Democratic Parties of 
CzechorS40vakia (Germans and Czechs) are represented in 
the govekent .  They, in conjunction with the bourgeoisie, 
are gradually introducing a fascist dictatorship in the coun- 
try, they are introducing measures which worsen the p i -  
- tion of the workers, of the peasants and of office employees, 
under the guise of fighting for "democracy." However, 
instead oS exposing the social-~emocratic Parties as such, 
the Chnmunist Party, for the sake of the united front, as 
they oppo~is t ical ly  interpret it, limited themselves to &ti- 
cizing only the -Social-Democratic leaders. Apparently, for 
the sake of the same opportunistically interpreted "unity of 
the working class," no Communist work is carried on in the 
reformist trade unions, notwithstanding the scores of de- 
cisions passed by the Comintern and by the Czecho-Slova- 
kian Communist Party itself on the necessity of carrying on 
such work. Similarly, the lC~rnmunist Party did not take 
advantage of all the favorable opportunities that presented 
themselves to organize the discontent of the masses of the 
workers. The Red trade unions have not increased their 
membership at the expense of the reformist trade unions 
which exist side by side with them. 
2. The Work of the Red a d  Reformist Trade U&ns 
By comparing the data on the state of the Red trade 
unions and rehrmist trade unions of metal workrs and 
miners, and by analyzing their work, we shall be able to see 
why. we have failed to win the workers away from the re- 
formist unions, and why we have even lost positions. The 
following figures indicate the membership of the respective 
unions : 
Red Trade Unions Reformist Trade Unions 
Metal Workers 
....... t Czech union. .68,871 .. January I, 1933. .22,075 German union. ...... zg,oar 
July I, 1933.. ...... 25,741 . Figures not &ailable 
Miners 
Czech union ..... .17,574 
1932 ....g....... 12B36 Czech union ..... .16,052 
July, 1933 ........ I I ,om German union. .... .13,350 
Thus, the Red Miners' Union lost 1;836 members, while 
the Czech reformist union gained 602 members. 
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I now pass to the work of the Red trade unions and re- 
formist trade unions. The Red Metal Workers' Union has 
140 local organizations and 21 factory-groups. But these 
local groups do not carry on any genuinely mass work in 
the factories. The district committees of the Red trade 
unions do not guide the work of the local groups, they do 
not command sufficient authority, and they lack initiative. 
The reformist Metal Workers' Union has 353 local 
groups. These groups are much more active than ours. 
The district committees work independently, and are author- 
itative podia. 
Benefits : the scale ofi unemployed benefits and the period 
of eligibility for benefits are about the same in the Red trade 
unions .and in the reformist trade unions; but the scale of 
benefits for the lower scales of contributions is from 8 to 10 
per cent lower in the Red Metal Workers' Union than in 
the reformist union. 
Crisis benefit (paid after 26 weeks of normal benefit) is 
65 per cent lower in the Red Metal Workers' Union than in 
the reformist union The scale of strike benefits paid by the 
Red trade unions and reformist metal workers' unions are 
about the same. But in big strikes the Red trade unions do 
not always adhere to their scale, and the amount of strike 
pay paid out depends upon the amount of money collected. 
The reformist union, however, usually pays strike pay in 
full. After the fourth week of a strike the reformist union 
usually pays an extra family allowance of ro krone per week. 
In addition to the benefits already mentioned, the reform- 
ist Metal Workersv Union also has sick and disablement 
benefits. The union imposes a levy of 50 hellers a week for 
this fund which is collected together with the trade union 
dues. 
Agitation and promando is conducted by the Red trade 
unions exclusively by means of the press and leaflets. Even 
during the election of the factory committees no oral agita- - 
tion and propaganda was carried on. Slogans and demands 
are drawn up by the Executive Committee of the union and 
for that reason they are not sufficiently concrete for each of 
the given trades. The lower 'organizations rest content with 
the material issued by the central body of the union and 
themselves do nothing to popularize these general slogans 
and demands in the factories, nor do they link them up with 
the everyday needs of the workers in the given factories. 
Generally speaking, the agitation carried on by the Red trade 
unions is of an abstract character. The lanqaage of the 
trade ~ n i o n  press differs in w way from the larzguage of the 
Party press. 
The reformist union not only carries on agitation and 
propaganda in the press, but also orally. It  issues only one- 
tenth of the leaflets and manifestoes issued by the Red trade 
unions. What i s  important, however, is that these leaflets 
and manifestoes are issued by the local branch of- the union 
and not by the Executive Committee, and- for that-reason 
they deal with the questions that interest. the workers in the - 
given town and in the given -factory. Moreover, the union. 
concentrates its agitation on questions concerning various 
measures of relief for the members; the slogans and de- 
mands put forward to the workers by the reformist trade 
unions are linked up with the demagogic proposals which the . 
Social-Democratic Party in parliament and the Social-Demo- 
cratic ministers in the government put forward. By that, 
the trade unions systematically popularize among the ~msses 
of the workers the activities of the Social-Democratic dep- - 
uties and ministers. The Social-Democrats and the ref ormist 
unions display great activity in the factories in painstaking 
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work and agitation. They devote special attention to oral 
agitation, which the Red trade unions do not do. 
While the Social-Democrats and the' reformists skilfully 
carry on work with individual workers in the factories to 
induce them to support the Social-Democratic measures of 
the government, the Red trade unions do not, with the same 
persistence, carry on agitation against the Social-Democrats 
and ref ormist trade union bureaucrats, 'whose activities daily 
provide a wealth of new material for their exposure. 
What are the results of this kind of "work"? 
Loss of membership in the Red miners' union, in spite 
of the fact that this year mass fights were waged under its 
leadership in 1Bru.x and in Rositz, which, however, were not 
utilized1 for the purpose of consolidating our influence. The 
local organizations function very badly. In Brux, for ex- 
ample, out of IOO pits there are only 13 pit groups, and these 
work badly. In the Rositz district, where in 1931 the Red 
miners' union had 17 members on pit committees, in 1933 
it did not secure the election of a single delegate. 
In spite of the influx of new members in the Red metal 
workers' union, there is a considerable loss in the decisive 
enterprises in the metallurgical industry. At the last factory 
committee elections we lost from 40 to 45 per cent of our 
vote. 
The relation if fo~ces between the reformist, fascist and 
Red unions iq the factory committees in 142 metallurgical 
enterprises is as follows : 
..... Czech reformist union. IOI members 
Fascist union. ............. 25 members (71.3%) 
Red union ................ g members 
During the election of factory committees in the metallur- 
cal industry in the German region, the total of 483 memo 
ers were distributed in the following way: 
........................ Red trade union 15 seats 
................. German reformist union -376 seats 
Czech rebrmist union 18 seats 
4 
..................... 
.......... German National-Socialist Union 38 seats 
Generally speaking, in a number of decisive enterprises 
the Red trade unions have suffered considerable setbacks 
d defeats in the factory committee elections during the 
st few months. For example, in one of the big enter- 
ises belonging to the Bohemia-Moravia Co. in Prague, 
, in 1932, obtained 27.3 per cent of the total vote, and in 
33 only 19.5 per cent of the total vote. At the Kolben 
rks in Prague, we, in 1932, obtained 27.9 per cent of the 
otal vote, and in 1933 only 16.8 per cent. A few weeks ago 
he factory committee elections took place at the Vitkovice 
ron Works, one of the largest enterprises in Czecho-Slo- 
akia, and one which is of enormous importance in the pre- 
.parations for war, Here we lost Ia per cent of our votes 
' -S cOrn@ft?d &th 1932. 
3. United Front Tactics 
After the Twelfth Plenum, a number of articles appedred 
1 the Communist Party press in which the tactics of the 
' 
united front were interpreted as a bloc between the Com- 
munist Party and the Social-Democratic Party. The ques- 
tion of Communist leadership in the united front of strug- 
gle was absolutely ignored. These opportunistic articles 
caused the Communists to place their hopes on negotiations 
between the Communist and the Social-Democratic Intema- 
+ionals, and to please the Social-Democrats and renegades, 
me Communists were urged to refrain from criticizing and 
exposing these traitors. The mistakes committed in the 
press of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia on the 
.question of the united front assume all the greater signifi- 
cance in that they became very widespread in the Party. 
After the Comintern had issued the appeal to form a . 
united proletarian front (in March this year), the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia 
made a proposal to the two Social-Democratic Parties, to the 
Czech National Socialists (the party of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Benesh, and to the Czech Socialists, to 
form a 'united front. In doing so the Central Committee 
committed a very serious blunder in that it did not, from the 
very outset, in its invitation to these organizations, clearly 
and openly explain to the masses of the workers the reac- 
tionary role that Social-Demracy was playing. As a con- 
sequence of this mistake, the face of. the Party became still 
more blurred as the united front campaign developed, and 
it led finally to a very definite tendency on the part of the 
Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia to distort the policy 
of the united front into a bloc with Social-Democracy. 
4. The Mktakes of the C. P. of ,Czer~o;Slovekia a d -  
Their- R e d t s  -.- - 
It must be said that: 
a) The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and the Red 
trade unions were unable to utilize the mass miners' strikes, 
which took place under their leadership, for the purpose of 
extending their influence, and of consolidating this influence, 
by drawing the miners into the Red unions, and hence proved 
incapable of striking a strong blow at the reformist miners' 
union. 
b) They failed to utilize the enormous dissatisfaction with 
the reformist leaders on the part of the members of the 
metal workers' union which, in spite of orders of the trade 
union bureaucracy to the contiary, got Comrade Zaptotsky 
to address a huge mass meeting. 
C) The above defects are to be explained by the fact that 
~ A u n i s t  Party Czecho Red trade 
unions had not yet learned to carry on painstaking mass 
work, to carry on agitation in a popular manner, to extend 
their influence and organizationally consolidate it, and also 
by the fact that they took up an opportunist position on a 
number of political questions generally, and an incorrect 
attitude toward Social-Democracy in particular, and espe- 
cially by the mistakes they committed in carrying out the 
united front tactics. Is it surprising after this that the 
workers do not see the enormous difference that exists be- 
tween the Communist and the Social-Democratic parties, and 
that, as a consequence o f  our clumsv agitation. thev believe 
that the only difference is that the Social-Democratic leaders 
are traitors and that it is only necessary to remove these 
leaders in order to transform the Social-Democratic Party 
into a revolutionab party? 
This is the main reason why the Communist Party of 
Czecho-Slovakia failed to mobilize the masses arrainst the 
suppression of the Young Communist League, the mass or- 
ganizations and the Party press. 
a) In addition to publishing the legal and illegal press and 
leaflets, it is necessary to car& on oral, group and individual 
agitation. 
b) It is necessary to consolidate the influence of the Red 
trade uaions and of the Party. 
c) I t  is necessary to intensify the work in the reformist 
trade unions, and to direct a hurricane fire against the Ger- C 5 7  
man and Czech trade union bureaucrats and Social-Demo- 
crats. 
d)  The leadership must give a proper line to the whole 
Party, and the opportunists in the Party must be exposed. 
Do E N G L A N D  
I. The C.P.G.3. Does Not Cornoldate I t s  Influence 
Among the Masses 
In England, before the last parliamentaty election, mass 
demonstrations were organized as a result of the very wide- 
spread discontent of the masses with the 10 per cent cut in 
the salaries of civil servants, the unemployed relief cuts, and 
the Means Test. The unemployed movement was led by 
the National Unemployed Workers' Movement and the cor- 
rect line adopted by the D d y  Worker on this question 
exercised a great influence upon the members of the Inde- 
pendent Labor Party, as well as upon the workers who fol- 
low its lead. This can explain the resolution passed by the 
I.L.P. conference on the desirability of establishing a united 
front with the Communists and of supporting the N.U.W.M. 
However, the Communist Party of Great Britain' failed 
to take full advantage of the favorable situation, it did not 
increase its membership, it did not increase its work in the 
reformist unions, and did not consolidate its influence in 
them. More than that, the Communist Party of Great 
Britain did not even utilize the "solidarity movement'' for 
the purpose of consolidating the increased influence it ob- 
tained as a result of this movement. 
2. The Maneuvers of the I;L.P. and the Mistakes of 
the C.P.G.B. 
The Communist Party did not take full advantage of the 
correspondence between the Cornintern and the I.L.P. in 
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order to win over to its'side individual organizations of the 
I.L.P. or any considerable numbers of the members of the 
I.L.P. It did not see through the maneuvers of the leaders 
of the I.LP. against the united front, and failed to appreciate 
the very definite discontent of the members of this party in 
a number of local organizations with their leaders' policy of 
sabotaging the Derby Conference resolution on the united 
front. It did not even give a proper reply to the I.L.P. 
leaders who resorted to the counter-revolutionary services 
of Trotsky. The latter, in order to prevent the members of 
the 1.L.P. from joining the Communist Party, poured forth 
a &ream of lies against the Communist International. 
'what  was this maneuver? Everyone here knows that at 
the Derby Conference of the I.L.P. the leaders spoke and 
voted against the resolution adopted by the conference call- 
ing upon the leaders to ask the C d n t e r n  in what way the 
I.L.P. could help the former in its work. A long corres- 
pondence followed. Our letter to the I.L.P. was couched in 
dear and simple terrns that every workers could under- 
stand. It very dearly and sharply described our differences 
with the 1.L.P. With this document. we wanted to help our 
English Party strengthen its work among the members of 
the 1.L.P. What was the position in the I.L.P. at that time? 
The majority of the members were in favor of a united front 
with the C.P.G.B., of rapprochement with the Comintern. 
The leaders of the I. L. P. were opposed to this. Clearly, 
our task was to drive a wedge between the leaders who 
sabotaged the Derby resolution and the members of .the 
I.L.P., who were in favor of the resolution. But owing to 
the fact that our English Party failed to develop the ne- 
cessary activity among the members of the I.L.P., a dual 
pmess took place: a section of the members of the I.L.P. 
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who belonged to the Right wing, and who were dissatisfied 
with the Derby resolution, returned to the Labor Party, 
from which the I.L.P. had only recently disaffiliated. The 
other section, which belonged to the Left wing, influenced 
by our exposure of the sabotage of the leaders on the one 
hand, and not being pulled together by the work of the Com- 
munists, which would have drawn them into the Communist 
Party, on the other hand, left the I.L.P. and abandoned 
politics altogether. As a result, our influence, which might 
have caused members of the I.L.P. to join our Party, was 
weakened. 
Actually sabotaging the decision of the Derby conference, 
the leaders of the I.L.P. started a long, diplomatic correspon- 
dence; In  order to pretend that they were carrying out the 
Derby decision they sent an enquiry to the Comintern asking 
in what way the I.L.P. could assist i t ;  but they did not 
make a single concrete proposal. At the same time, they 
evidently proposed the following division of labor to the 
district leaders : the National Council of the I.L.P., i.e., the 
central leadership, is to continue formal negotiations in ac- 
cordance with the Derby resolutions, while the leadership 
OF the local organizations, notwithstanding the desires of 
their members, is openly to oppose the united front. As a 
result of this maneuver, the following situation was created :' 
in its letter to us the National Council of the 1.L.P; does not 
openly reject our proposal but restricts itself to polemical 
remai-ks, and adopts a resolution on strengthening the united 
front in England. At the same time it succeeds in getting 
several local organizations OF the I.L.P. to pass resolutions 
against the united front decision. Our Party did not under- 
stand this maneuver. The Daily Worker wrote that the 
resolution of .the National Council of the I.L.P. was a step 
forward. Very belatedly our newspaper reported cases of 
openly expressed hostility of local I.L.P. leaders towards 
the united front. Placing its hopes on the evolution of the 
National Council of the I.L.P. to our side, our Party allowed 
the decisive moment for winning the members of the I.L.P. 
to slip by. 
It must be admitted that we have not yet obtained as much 
as we d d  and should have obtained from this correspon- 
dence. We have not increased the membership of our Party 
at the expense of the Independent Labor Party; we have 
not won over whole organizations, which was quite possible. 
Meanwhile, Trotsky comes onto the scene in order to develop 
his counter-revolutionary attack on the Soviet Union in the 
pages of the New Leader, and, while criticising the I.L.P. 
from the right, creates the necessary smoke screen for the 
maneuvers of the National Council to deceive the working 
class members of the I.L.P. The Communist Party, and 
our central organ, failed also ti, expose Trotsky's counter- , 
revolutionary outburst. 
Our Party must exert enormous effort to make up for 
what it has. lost in this campaign. 
3. The Work of the Scottish RevoluCionwy a d  Reformist 
M a s '  U&ra 
The recent municipal elections have shown that the dom- 
munist Party had not increased its influence among the 
working class in Great Britain to any considerable degree. 
The Communist Party has not even organized the work of 
the only union that we have, the United ~ ineworKe~s  of 
Scotland. 
At the present time the revolutionary United Minework- 
ers oft Scotland has 3,000 members (the majority of . w b  
are in Fife ; in 1931 the reformist union had nearly 8,000). 
The reformist union has 20,ooo members. The revolutionary 
union has 49 branches, of which only two are organized on 
a pit basis; the rest organize the miners qccording to place 
of residence, in the mining villages. The union is in a bad 
way financially. Its expenditure considerably exceede its 
income, which is due mainly to the large number of paid 
,officials. Thus, in addition to paid organizers, .who also col- 
lect membership dues, the union has special dues collectors 
who m i v e  a salary, and a percentage on dues collected in 
addition. The reformist union has 54 branches in Fifeshire 
alone and 92 in Lanarkshire. 
How is work carried on in these two unions? 
In I@, at the time of the split, the Cornrnunisfk had 
strong fractions in all the branches of the revolutionary union 
and in its leading bodies, the executive committee and dele- 
gate council (in the leading bodies alone there were 69 
Commuaists). At the present time only @ Party members 
are organized in the Red miners' union. In the reformist 
miners' union, the Communists have no positions whatever. 
Out of 370 pits (of which 60 are large pits) the revolu- 
tionary union carries on work only in 16. Although it se- 
cures improvements for the workers in separate struggles, 
insufficient advantage is taken of these successes to extend 
and organizationally consolidate influence acquired by or- 
ganizing pit committees, etc. This year the union carried on 
considerable work in the election of pit inspectors (hitherto 
safety conditions in the mines had been ignored). In spite 
of all the efforts of the reformists to pour ridicule on the 
campaign developed by our union, the latter managed to 
secure the election of 10 inspectors in 5 pits, all members 
of the revdutionary miners' union, although the reformists 
also put up their candidates. But these inspectors did not 
use the material they collected, on the violation of the safety 
regulations, in order to mobilize the masses in the pits to 
fight against these irregularities. 
Under the guidance of the Red union, 8 pit papers are 
published. Although these papers publish a fair amount of 
workers' correspondence; correctly present political ques- 
tions, played a big part in the aforementioned election of 
inspectors, they, however, do not deal sufficiently with the 
work of their own union, do not give the officials guidance 
as to how to carry on their work and above all, they do not 
sufficiently fight against the reformist miners' union. 
Generally speaking, the guidance of the work of the local 
organizations and eels of the Red trade union is very 
weak, notwithstanding the relatively large number of paid 
officials. The committees of the local unions do not hear 
reports on the work of these officials, do not concretely criti- 
cise the defects in this work, and in the majority of cases 
limit themselves to passing re'solutions on the inactivity of 
the local branches. 
In the summer of 1933, the union developed a wide cam- 
paign throughout the coalfield against the wage cuts, for a 
10 per cent increase in wages, for a 7-hour day without re- 
duction of wages, for the abolition of overtime, for improve- 
ment of safety measures, etc. Commenting on this cam- 
paign, ,Mr. Ebby Edwards, General Secretary of the Min- 
ers' Federation of Great Britain, speaking in Swinton,' York- 
shire, said: 
"We are ready tomorrow to negotiate with the employers not 
merely to prevent a reduction of wages, but to put the industry 
outside the pale of continual codict . . . It is not my intention 
to call a union stoppage in July, but to obtain 100 per cent uGon 
membership to prevent a stoppage. . . ." ( D d y  Worker, April 22, 
1933.) 
In spite of the fact that the reformists so clearly ignored 
the pressing needs of the miners, the campaign developed 
by the Red union was not crowned with success, precisely 
because. it did not sufficiently expose the reformist trade 
union bureaucrats. c. 
The Red union organized Women's Guilds for the wives 
of $$ members. These women's guilds organize outings, 
social evenings, concerts, etc., for the purpose of collecting 
fbnds. But neiiher the leaders of the union nor the Party 
-organizations devote constant attention to these guilds, do 
not widen their field of activity, and do not draw them into 
political work. . 
The reformist unions, however, in their mass work make 
wide use of! the Miners' Institutes, which are built up with. 
money from the Miners' Welfare Fund. These institutes, 
which exist in every village, have halls for meetings and 
dances, gymnasiums, billiard rooms, reading rooms and 
libraries. Frequently, lectures are arranged. In a number 
of institutes, technical training courses are organized for the 
miners. Throughout the whole of Scotland (with the ex- 
ception of Fife, where the revolutionary union is stronger 
than the reformist union), it is only the reformist union 
that utilizes the Miners' Institutes for mass work. More- 
over the reformists have access to the Workers' Educational 
Association, which organizes classes on various subjects in 
many places. 
The revolutionary union does nothing to combat the in- 
fluence of these organizations. 
4. A Few ConcZUSiOm 
Thus, the Communist Party of Great Britain and the Rev- 
olutionary Miners' Union have all the advantages of putting 
forward the urgent demands of the workers and of fighting 
for these demands but they are unable to mobilize the masses 
for the struggle against the reformist unlon, they are unable 
on this basis to organize the work in the reformist union 
(after the split nearly all the Communists left that union), 
they are unable to increase their membership and consolidate 
I their influence. 
W That being the case,'how can the Communist Party of - 
Britain increase its membership and consolidate its 
influence if the Communists do not work in the unions, or 
work badly, that is to say, do not fight to obtain influence? 
And yet, in England, if work in the trade unions were car- 
ried on properly and energetically, influence could be won 
and consolidated. 
h' At the present time new wage cuts .are being imposed in 
England and the conditions of the unemployed are being 
greatly worsened. The National Government, at the head 
of which is one of the ex-leaders of the Second ~nterna- 
tional, is introducing a number of terrorisfic measures against 
the working class, the like of which England has never 
known behre. In the British trade unions discontent is 
growing. In a number of trade unions (engineers, railway- 
men, etc.) there is a change of temper in favor of the Cem- 
munist Party, of a united front, etc. The Communist Party 
must at all costs increase its membership by enlisting mem- 
bers of the most important trade unions and employed work- 
ers. 
?. I come now to Germany. 
E. G E R M A N Y  
. The ~chievemelr t~  of tke Communist Party of Germany 
Before Hitler came to power, the Communist Party of 
Germany had achieved considerable success in mobilizmg 
and organizing the masses for the revolutionary struggle 
ainst fascism. I will enumerate a few of these: 
- 7 < .  
- -  - . < -  2 >: 
a)  In November, 1932, the Party obtained 6,000,ooo votes 
in the parliamentary elections, and in the big, industrial ten- 
ters it received the highest percentage d votes. 
b) I t  organized a number of big strikes against the Papen 
wage cuts decree. I t  w a ~  only because of this that the 
decree was held in abeyance, and, in spite of the opposition 
of the reformists, the workers in a very short period of time 
achieved successes in their struggtes. - 
c) In spite of the unceasing sabotage of the Social-Demo- 
cratic Party and the reformists, the Communist Party of 
Germ-any managed in a number of cases to organize a united 
front from below with local Social-Democratic workers to 
L resist the fascist gang$ that attacked trade union and Party premises. Whenever the workers put up resistance against 
the fascists the Communists were in the front ranks and 
received the heaviest blows of the. class enemy ; they dis- 
played fine examples of self-sacrifice and indomitableness 
in the struggle. 
d) The Communist Party of .Germany increased its mem- 
bership by tens of thousands and waged a determined strug- 
gle against the Neumann-Remmele group which hampered 
mass work. 
e) The mass organizations that were under the leadership 
of the Party, principally the Red trade union opposition, in- 
tensified their work and strengthened their contacts with the 
broad strata of the workers. 
f )  At the time Hitler came into power the Communist 
Party of Germany managed to organize demonstrations and 
political .strikes in a number of towns and enlisted Soci-al- 
Democratic workers in the struggle against fascism. The 
social-Democratic Party alone is responsible for the victory 
of fascism. It split the working class ; it opposed the united 
proletarian front of revolutionary struggle by a united re- 
actionary front with the bourgeoisie ; it hamstrung the work- 
ing class by means of the centralized mass organizations at 
the head of which it stood. 
g) In its resolution of April I, 1933, "On the Present 
ituation in Germany," the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. stated 
hat the political line and the organizational policy of the 
Party of Germany, before, and at the time the 
sts came to power, were quite correct. I have no doubt . 
the Plenum will fully approve of the resoltttion passed 
he Presidium of the E.C.C.I. on the German question. 
his resolution on Germany was one of the most im- 
ol&ons passed since the Twelfth Plenum. ' 
this resolution is very closely connected with 
nother very important document, viz., the document on the 
nited front. It is well known that the parties affiliated to 
e Second International hurled themselves upon the Ger- 
n Communist Party in order to conceal its own treachery, 
eachery of the G e r m  Sd-Democrats. It tried to 
e it appe;)r that the responsibility for the coming into 
wer of the d s t s  rested not only on the German Social- 
ernocrats, but also on the Communist International and 
n the Communist Party of Germany. The Sodal-Democrats 
,f all countries lied to the workers, saying: the Communists 
lso failed to fight against fascism; they did not call for 
surrection, for a strike, or sabotage. If the leaders of any 
ne of our sections have failed to understand our dacunat, 
ich raised the question as to whether a party can or 
uld, in the absence of a revolationary situation and when 
t has not got a majority of the working class' behiad it, 
opt an adventurist policy and call for an armed uprishqg- . 
they have not understood thist how can they fight against 
h) After the Hitler coup, the Communist Party of Get- 
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many very quickly reorganized itself for underground work. 
In spite of the exceptionally cynical and despicable provoca- 
tion on the part of the Hitler government from the very 
first days of its unbridled dictatorship, the.majority of the 
workers who followed the Communist Party remained loyal 
to the Party. In spite of the raging White terror, 4,600,ooo 
electors in the Reichstag elections, on March 5,  voted f ~ r  the 
Communist Party. And to vote for the Communist Party on 
that day, when the whole apparatus of the state and all the 
parties were directed against us, and when such acts of 
provocation as the burning of the Reichstag were perpetrated 
against us, was not a simple thing. It was an act of heroism 
on the part of the masses of the workers of Germany. 
2 4  Defects in the Wwk of the CommuGst Party of 
Germany 
It goes without saying that with all the great successes 
achieved by the Communist Party of Germany before the - 
fascists' coming to power and now, when it is working under- 
ground, it committed, and is committing certain mistakes. 
1. want to mention same of these because the Communist' 
Party of Germany, as well as the other Communist Parties, 
must avoid these mistakes in the future. 
' It must be admitted that before Hitler came to power the 
Communist Party of Germany, largely through the fault of 
.Neumann, who was then in the leadership, devoted very lit- 
tle attention, in its agitation among the broad masses of the 
people, co the struggle against the badage of Versailles ; and 
, yet, the discontent of the masses with the Versailles Treaty 
was v e j  great. It was not the Communist Party of Ger- 
many but the Nationalists and the National-Socialists who, 
for their demagogic purposes, took advantage of the dis- 
content over the whole of Germany, and as far back as 1928 
put forward the demand for a referendum against the Young 
Plan. Instead of taking the initiative in raising the ques- 
tion of fighting against the Versailles Treaty before the 
masses, if only in the form of a referendum against the 
Young Plan, and explaining that only a Soviet Germany, in 
alliance with the proletariat of other countries, could throw 
off the yoke of Versailles, and instead of simultaneously 
waging a determined struggle against the chauvinistic provo- 
cation of the masses by the National-Socialists, the Commu- 
nist Party of Germany sneered at the demand put forward 
by the Nationalists and National-Socialists. The number 
of votes cast in favor of a referendum, and during the 
referendum itself, showed that the demand of the Na- 
tionalists and of the National-Socialists met with a wide 
response among the masses of the petty bourgeoisie, and 
perhaps also among a section of the workers. 
Thus, the Communist Party of Germany not only failed 
to take the initiative in this movement, but that section of 
the population which voted for the proposal of the National- 
ists and National-Socialists, interpreted the attitude of the 
Cornrnunist Party towards the referendum as expressing 
lack of desire on the part of the Communists to fight againit 
the Versailles Treaty. 
The Communist Party ,of Germany did not with sufficient 
persistence and intensity wage a campaign against the Wei- 
mar Coalition, and principally against Social-Democracy, 
against all the heasures introduced for the purpose of wors- 
ening the position of the workers and peasants (wage re- 
ductions, reductions of unemployed relief, the ruination of 
the peasantry by taxation, debts, etc.). The National-So- 
cialists took advantage of the widespread discontent with 
these measures in order to win over to their own side the 
broad masses of the people, including a section of unem- 
ployed workers. 
The agitation the Communist Party waged against the 
fascists was not popular in style, was not concrete and did 
not penetrate deeply among the masses. . In its agitation,'the 
Communist Party of Germany did not utilize the experience 
of what had already taken place in those countries where 
fascism was alreidy in power (Poland, and particularly 
. Italy), viz., that fascism did not carry out a single one of 
the lavish demagogic promises it had made before it came 
into power. 
Take, for example, some of the promises made by the 
Italian fascists, which they published as far back as 1919, 
such as: land for the peasants, the confiscation of a con- 
siderable part of the capital of the country, workers' control 
of industry, the confiscation of war profits, abolition of the 
Senate, convocation of a Constituent Assembly which was to 
express the will of the people for a republic or monarchy, 
independence and complete liberty o f  urban and rural self- 
government, universal suffrage, including woman suff age. 
In his speeches Mussolini went even further and, in addition 
to all this, promised to ."expropriate all the large landed 
estates, steamships, mines and all forms of transport. When 
we (i.e., the fasdsts-Q.P.) will have settled with Asiatic 
Bolshevism, we will abolish the capitalists and landlords." 
Although the German fascists did not go as far as that, 
they, nevertheless, in their furious demagogy, borrowed not 
a little from the lying promises of Mussolini and his cut- 
throats. In order more convincingly to prove to the masses 
that Hitler and his gangs were striving, not to satisfy the  
needs of the workers, the peasants, offre employees, the 
urban petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, etc., but to estab- 
lish the terrorist dictatorship of monopolist capital, furiously 
intensify the exploitation of the workers, ruthlessly to ruin 
the main masses of the peasantry, to rob the urban petty -F
urgeoisie, etc., the German Communists, in their agitation 
inst the National Socialists, should have compared the 
ornises made by Mussolini before he came into power with 
e program he actually did carry out and is now pursuing. 
According to the ofkid returns taken from Italian fascist 
urces (hence it can be taken that the figures are minim- 
from the summer of 1927 to the end of 1931, the a 
of the Italian workers in various industries dropped 
ent, while red wages dropped 24-45 per cent (the 
are due to a slight reduction in prices). 
By all sorts of special laws the landlords were relieved 
their laborers against accidents, while 
the red wages of agricultural laborers declined 34.2 per cent 
the period from 1919 to 1932. 
Even before the German fascists, the Italian fascists said: 
r the unemployed." And yet, accord- 
st figures, in March 1932, there were in Italy 
053,076 unemployed, while unemployed relief was paid 
286,624 unemployed, and only for a period of n days. 
n December 1932, the numba of unemployed rose, but the 
iving relief dropped and the amount of relief 
was reduced by 45 per cent. And yet, every worker mwt 
ntribute to the unemployed fund (the fund is made up 
50 per cent contributed by the workers and 50 per cent 
Even before the German f d s t s ,  the Italian f a x W  
oled the unemployed by promising the needy winter rdief. 
in the winter of 1931-32 this winter relief in I d y  
unted to the payment of 15 centimes per day to ~gg+668 
persons (a newspaper costs 20 centimes). This is 
from the fwt that immediately the fascists came to 
71  
power in Italy, strikes were prohibited, the trade unions were 
seized, the 'workers' press was destroyed, etc. 
All these and similar facts were, of course, known to the 
German ~ornmunists,~but they did not make proper use of 
them in their agitation against the f k s t s .  Even if, at 
the time, a section of the workers would not have'believed 
the Communists had they said that the German fascists 
would follow in the footsteps of the Italian fascists, this 
* agitation would have been of great significance, because the 
' workers who had been deceived by the fascists would have 
realized afterwards that the Communists had spoken the 
truth and this, of course, would have accelerated the pene- 
tration of Communist influence among these backward strata 
of the working class. 
Very belatedly, the Communist Party of Germany, in 
August 1930, issued its program for the social national 
liberation of the German people. The publication of this 
program, and the propaganda developed in connection with 
it, was very useful to the Communist Party of Germany, 
although Rote Fahne, of which Neumann was at the head 
at the time, distorted the slogan of a "people's revolution" 
and adapted it to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie (the 
proletarian class content of the slogan-the proletarian revo- 
lution and the dictatorship of the proletariat-was deleted 
from it). But very soon the Party organizations almost 
forgot about this program. 
There is no need h r  me to repeat all that has been said 
a l . ady .  about the defects -in the work of the Communist 
Party of Germany among the unemployed. The few unem- 
plo$ed committees that existed did not embrace the very 
strata of the unemployed that were deprived of even charit- 
able reliei, and yet it was among this section of the unem- 
ployed that the fascists achieved most success. 
In spite of numerous decisions, resolutions, declarations, 
etc., the organizations of the Communist Party of Germany 
did not really devote proper attention to improving the work 
in the factories. They did not establish new contacts at the 
time when, with the growth of fascism, the members of the 
Party and of the Red trade union opposition began to be 
discharged in ever increasing numbers. The result of this 
was soon felt. At the time of the fascist corp the influence 
of the Communist Party in the factories was insignificant, 
and a section of the workers who feared dismissal began 
to join the fascist factory organizations, and were not re- 
strained from doing this by the Communists and the mem- 
bers of the Red trade union opposition. 
The work of the Communists in the reformist unions 
and in other mass organizations had not improved very 
much by the'time Hitler came into power. 
The Communists and the members of the Red trade union 
opposition represented an insignificant percentage in the 
factory committees. But the fact that the majority of the 
Red factory committees, and the members of the Red fac- 
tory committees, did not work any better than the reform- 
ists had very serious consequences. 
The unemployed organizations did not embrace the broad 
masses and their work was unsatisfactory, so that, when 
Hitler came into power, our influence in these organiza- 
tions greatly declined. . I . .  
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.Ebr these reasons the social-fascists and trade union 
bureaucrats succeeded in hindering the workers from re- 
sponding to the call of the Communist Party for a mass 
strike at the most acute moment for the working class. 
Compared with 1924, the Communist Party of Germany 
has considerably increased its influence in the working dass 
during the past few years; from May 1924 to November 
1932, it doubled its vote. However, we must say in rqprd 
to & m y  what has already been said in regard to 
other countries, vk., in Germany, also, the growing influ- 
ence of the Communist Party was not consolidated. How 
can the Communist Party consolidate its influence? By re- 
cruiting a section of the masses who follow the Cornmu- 
nists for the organizations which stand dose to the Com- 
munist Party, principally for the trade unions, and by 
recruiting the best of them, the more advanced of them, 
' into the Party itself. 
In Germany, as in other countries, a number of mass or- 
- ganizations were formed: International- Labor Defence, 
Workers' International Relief, Freethinkers' Union, Ex- - 
Service Men's League, Friends of the Soviet Union, Red 
sports organizations, unemployed organizations and trade 
union opposition. What a tremendous variety! But the un- 
fortunate thing is that the membership of all these organiza- 
tions was practically the same. The broad masses of electors 
who voted for us were not drawn into these organizations. 
The Communists did not work sufficiently in the mass work- 
ing class organizations of the reformists and Catholics - 
sports clubs, cultural organizations, etc. 
One of the most important functions of the trade union 
opposition was to work in the reformist and Catholic trade 
unions. But neither in the one nor in the other was the 
work adequate. This could not but lead to the fact that in 
the reformist and Catholic organizations we not only failed 
to fight against the Social-Democrats and the Catholic 
Center, but also against the leadership of these organiza- 
tions (trade union, sports, etc.). 
The organizations that supported the Communist Party 
did not embrace the broad masses of the workers, and in 
the reformist and Catholic organizations we hardly kought 
at all against the reformists, we did not oppose our program, 
our tactics, our demands to their treacherous policy. We 
failed to organize the members of these organizations and 
lead them, 
As a result, we failed to consolidate the influence we had 
acquired in the parliamentary elections before Hitler came 
to power. 
After being driven underground, the Party exerted colos- 
sal efforts to publish and distribute literature on all the 
important questions of the revolutionary struggle. In spite 
of the incredible terror, it is easier to work among the Ger- 
man proletariat now, because the Social-Democratic workers 
and the non-party workers who supported the Social-Demo- 
crats, and also the members of the reformist unions, are in 
large numbers becoming disillusioned with the policy of 
Social-Democracy, 
Even the German fascists are compelled to admit that 
they have failed to smash up and exterminate the Commu- 
nist Party of Germany. Revolutionary workers, who for- 
merly belonged to other political trends, distribute Coinmu- 
nist literature and help the Communists in their work in 
every way. The authority of the Party has grown enor- 
mously in the eyes of the broad masses. The Co~~bmunist 
Party of Germany is really not only the only party of the 
working class in Germany, but also the only party that is 
leading the struggle f w  the defense of the interests of the 
working class against the fascist dictatorship. Thanks to 
the changed situation in Germany and to the heroic work 
of the Communist Party, the Communists no longer meet 
with the resistance in the working class that was formerly 
put up by the trade union bureaucrats and the Social- 
Democratic Party. More than that, the young menibers 
of the Social-Democratic Party are inclining towards the 
Communist Party and are prepared to fight shoulder to 
shoulder with the Communists against the fascist dictator- 
ship. In this connection it is necess&y to emphasize the 
extreme urgency of a determined struggle against those 
Communists who desire to close the doors of the Commu- 
nist Party to such workers. Cases have occurred when 
Social-Democratic workers desired to join our Party, but 
the Communists formed them into sympathizers' groups and 
appointed commissars over them instead of drawing them 
into the Party organizations and giving them work to do. 
I t  must be admitted, however, that the mass work of the 
Cumrnuni& Party has not yet been organized on a wide 
scale, there is a lack of oral, individual agitation, which is 
more than ever necessary at the present time. Communist 
speeqhes at fascist trade union meetings are still rare, al- 
though anti-fascist-minded workers do speak at these meet- 
ings. The fascists continue to make their demagogic dec- 
larations that. they are going to abolish unemployment, that 
they. are going to provide the unemployed with work, that 
they are going to improve the conditions of the workers, 
etc., not in the least disturbed by the fact that apart from 
the usual seasonal revival unemployment has not declined, 
that unemployed relief has been reduced to the utmost ex- 
treme, and in many cases completely abolished, that wages, 
nominal, and still more, real wages, have declined. In an 
election speech delivered at the Skmens Works on Novem- 
ber 10, Hitler said: "When I came into power there were 
more than 6,200,000 unemployed in Germany, and now 
there are only 3,710,000. If some, while not denying this, 
say that our standard of living has not improved, I reply 
. . . the first task was to put people back to work." 
To prove in a popular manner, with facts and figures, 
that the fascist dictator is lying, is very easy and at the same 
time very important: it is necessary to prove that this is a 
lie in such a way that every working class family, that 
every employed and unemployed worker may see that it is 
a lie. There is no need for me to emphasize again here how 
exceptionally imwrtant it is at the present time to expose 
the policy of fascism by means of .concrete illustrations, in 
order to liberate the petty bourgeoisie of town and country, 
and those unemployed who still believe the fascist phrases, 
from fascist influence. But unfortunately, the German Com- 
munists are not doing this, or are doing it badly. The Odo- 
ber issue of the illegal Rote Fahne reports that from Jan- 
uary to July this'year, the average wage per worker de- 
clined by 21 4 per cent, and the total m u n t  of wages paid 
in this period declined by 6.3 per cent. And this is reported 
in just a few lines. But these facts provide us with enor- 
mous opportunities for opening the eyes of the broad 
masses of the toilers. The $hole issue should have been 
devoted to this question; a number of leaflets should have 
been issued on this subject, explaining in a popular manner 
the real position of the working class in fascist Germany. 
There are indications that the workers who are disappoint- 
d with the fascist unions are beginning to join illegal 
nions. Everything must be done to enlarge the number 
f illegal unions and to recruit for them the ex-members 
f reformist and Catholic unions. The Communist Paity of 
ermany must avoid the mistake committed by the Corn- 
unist Party of Italy, which for five years was unable to 
rganize its work in the mass, fascist, workers' organiza-' 
ons. It must organize its mass work in the fascist trade 
nions, in the factory sports organizations, youth organiza- 
ions and compulsory labor camps. In carrying on ener- 
etic work in these organizations, .the Party must rally all 
e discontented elements for the fight against fascism. Only 
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by this, by increasing the work in the factories, and also by 
improving the work in the revolutionary trade unions and 
other revolutionary organizations, will ihe Communist Party 
be able to &tend and consolidate its influence in the work- 
ing dass. 
3. Common Weaknesses of the Majority of the Sections 
of the Commukst Internatwnd 
What I have just said applies not only to the Communist 
Party of Germany, but to the majority of the Communist 
Parties in the capitalist countries. It cafl be stated quite 
definitely that : 
a) In many cases we carry on our agitation unskillfully, 
not popularly, not correctly (Norway, Czechoslovakia, etc.) ; 
our agitation does not penetrate deeply into the masses; 
b) The Communist Parties have not yet learned to con- 
solidate the influence they have already acquired. 
I shall quote a few examples: 
I. On International Unemployed Day, in the United 
*tes, 1,225,000 workers in all the industrial centers an- 
swered the call oE the Communist Party to demonstrate. . 
But the Communist Party failed to consolidate this response . 
by' creating broad unemployed organizations. And what 
happened? The influence of the Communist Party of the 
United States soon evaporated. But even now-in spite of 
the fact that after the wage cuts resulting from the recent 
measures introduced by Roosevelt the American workers 
are returning to the trade unions-the revolutionary trade 
rmions have increased their membership to a very small 
extent bnly, while the reactionary trade unions which are 
affiliated to the A. F. of L. have increased their member- 
shipvby hdf a million. 
2. LaSt year, in England, when the 10 per cent cut in 
- civil servants' salaries and unemployed relief was intro- 
* 1 
-:. duced, the National ~nem~1o)ed Workers Movement made 
> 
excellent use of the discontent of the .broad masses of the 
nemployed to organize huge demonstrations the like of r hich have not been seen in Efigland for a long time. But 
Jais influence was not co fisolidated. 
3 
The "solidarity movement," under the leadership of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain, not only organized 
demonstrations,. but also took part in a number of strikes. 
This "solidarity movementyy is not in itself a strong, well- 
dr ilt organization, and failed to consolidate its influence. Thus, during the past year, broad masses of the workers in England were drawn into the struggle with the help of 
the Communist Party and the organizations that follow its 
e d. Nevertheless, we see no material change in the attitude the workers towards the Communist Party. The recent unidpal elections show that although the masses of the 
workers are deserting the National Laborites and the Con- 
servatives, they are again voting for the Laborites, and 
ve not yet found the road to the Communist' Party. It is 
rticularly true of England that the basis of the Party can 
broadened and its positions consolidated best of all by 
working in all the reformist trade unions, fighting in them 
for influence, fighting for the removal of the inveterate-re- 
formist trade union bureaucrats, and for their substitution 
revolutionary workers. But the Party organizations do 
t yet sufficiently realize this and act accordingly. 
: The Sg~ificance of Moss Work and of Comolkiatz*fig 
Acquired Influence 
By improving oral agitation-individual and -group agi- 
tion, but particularly individual agitation-and by carry- 
it deeply among the broad masses, we can extend our 
I - ,  . h 
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influence. By creating our own mass organizations and by 
working in the mass working dass organizations of our 
opponents ( fascist, ref ormist, Catholic), tlie Communists 
can consolidate this influence. 
* 
I said at the beginning of my speech that in this moment 
of the acute intensification of the class struggle the Com- 
munist Parties, by pursuing a correct political line and with 
firm revolutionary leadership, can free the broad masses 
from the influence of the social-democrats, the reformict 
and fascist trade unions, and other organizations, and that 
they d n  win the majority of the working dass only by 
improving their mass work and consolidating their influ- 
ence. This, in its turd, will serve as the guarantee that the 
Comnjunist Parties will be able to take the lead in the de- 
cisive battles for the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
In order to show to what extent the mass work of the 
Communist Parties and the oonsolidation of their influence 
plays a decisive role in the organization and the victory 
of the revolution, it is sufficient to compare Germany in 
I923 with Russia in 191~. During the revolutionary situa- 
tion in Germany in 1923, the Social-Democratic Party was 
in a state of complete disintegration, the trade unions lost 
two-thirds of their membership. The trade' union appar- 
atus fell to pieces because there was no money with which 
to pay the officials. But at that time the Communist Party 
had no mass workers' organizations, even trade unions. 
The Communist Party was not sufficiently connected with 
the factory committees-which played such an important 
role in Berlin in 1923 (the strike against the Cuno gov- 
ernment)-because there were no Communist nuclei in the 
factories. All the various trends existing in the leadership of 
the Cermilunist Party were opposed to organizing soviets. 
Had not the Communists almost entirely abandoned the 
80 
reformist unions, they, in view of the weakness of the 
trade union apparatus, could have won the majority of 
the important unions. The trade unions and factory com- 
mittees would then have become the mass organizations by 
means of which the Party could have utilized the revolrr- 
tionary situation in order to take power. I t  is now gener- 
ally well known that the leadership of the Communist 
Party at that time estimated the political situation in an op- 
portunistic manner and allowed the opportune moment for 
seizing power to slip by. One of the important factors in 
this was that the Party lacked driving belts connecting it 
with the proletariat, etc., mass working class organizations. 
The policy and practice of the Bolsheviks in Russia in 
1917 was altogether different. In spite of all the, difference 
there is between Russia of 1917 and Germany of 1923, 
with which there is no need to deal now, it is still possible 
to draw a parallel between them and to compare the Bol- 
shevik mass work in 1917 with the helplessness of the lead- 
ership of the Communist Party of Germany in 1923 in re- 
gard to the winning of the masses. 
After the February victory over 'czarism, the Bolsheviks, 
everywhere, including all the industrial centers, were in 
the minority in the workers' and soldiers' organizations 
(factory committees, soviets, trade unions, in the company ; 
regimental, brigade, army corps and front committees) ; 
they did not .have a majority either in the working class or 
among the soldiers. But thanks to the correct political line 
they pursued, the ti;nely advancement of slogans which 
mobilized the revolutionary activity of the masses, and the 
broad printed and oral agitation they carried on, including 
individual agitatiori in the factories, in the trade unions, 
the factory committees, in the soviets, in all the sddiers' 
mmittees and barracks, they, day after day, extended 
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their influence in the struggle against the bourgeoisie, the 
Mensheviks, and the socialist-revolutionaries. They consoli- 
dated this growing influence and won elected positions in all 
the workers' and soldiers' organizations (members of sovi- 
ets, members of executives of trade unions, of factory com- 
mittees and of the various soldiers' committees). As a re- 
sult of this work, the Bolsheviks, on the eve of the Octo- 
ber Revolution, had the majority in the soviets, in the fac- 
tory committees, in the trade unions and the elected sol- 
diers' bodies. The Mensheviks and socialist-revolutionaries 
still held certain positions in the central bodies, such as the 
All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the All-Russian 
Council of Trade Unions, the All-Russian Executive Cam- 
mittee of Railway Transport Workers' Union, and in the 
front and army corps committees; but they were powerless, 
as the lower organizations refused to follow their lead. 
Allowing for the concrete situation in each country, the 
Communist Parties must fight to win the working class 
organizations in the same way as the Russian Bolsheviks 
did in 1917. 
I how come to the last part of my speech. 
F. THE COMMUNIST PARTIES' PREPARATION FOR UNDER- 
GROUND WORK, UTILIZATION OF LEGAL POSSIBILITIES 
AND REDISTRIBUTION OF CADRES 
I. The Utilization of ad the Possibilities in the Conditions 
in Which t?w Party is Working: 
According to the degree and character of1 the persecution 
to which they are subjected by the bourgeois state, the sec- 
tions of the Communist International can be divided into 
three categories, viz., more or less legal Communist Parties 
(16, including the Communist Party in the Soviet regions 
in China which is here legal) ; semi-legal (7) ; and corn- 
pletely illegal (38). Recently the line of development has 
been in the direction of the further intensification of the 
dass struggle and the growth of fascism, which must affect 
e position of the Communist Parties. Undoubtedly, in 
1 countries the Communist Parties will be driven under- 
ound on the outbreak of war. It is difficult to forecast 
the form the illegal position of this or that Communist 
will assume. 
countries where the Communist Parties have been 
underground can be divided into two categories, Vis., 
the countries where the Communist Parties have been 
driven underground, but where the mass reformist workers' 
organizations continue -to exist legally (Poland, Austria. 
Bulgaria, Japan, ' etc.) ; and countries where all working - 
class organization8 and all pditical parties have been dis- 
solved and only fascist organizations exist. 
In the first category of countries the Communist Party 
must use all the niass workers' organizations for the pur- 
poses of their work, such as the trade unions, cooperative 
;organizations, sports organizations, workers' educational 
ganizations, freethinkers' organizations and the workers' 
ni+tions of all trends, such as reformist, Christian, 
n all such organizations Communist fractions s h d d  
organized. In these countries, efforts must be made to 
the Party committees to guide the work of the Corn- 
unist fractions, to prevent the latter from becoming iso- 
ted from the Party, to get them to carry out the Party 
ine aid to get the Party committees to help them in their 
rk. At the same time, the semi-legal and illegal revolu- 
ionary workers' and peasants' organizations must be 
In the second category of countries, the C u ~ u n i s t  
arties must utilize for their work all the fascist mass or- 
ganizations to which workers, office employees, peasants, 
young workers and women workers belong, such as trade 
unions, sports and co-operative organizations, youth organ- ' 
izations and women's organizations. Not only is it necessary 
to organize constant work in these organizations, but it is 
also necessary to arrange for people to speak at meetings 
called by these organizations. 
The Communist Party of Germany must avoid the mis- 
take committed by the Communist Party of Italy, and im- 
mediately commence work in the fascist organizations. 
In countries like Germany and Italy, working-class mass 
organizations such as trade unions, I.L.D., unemployed or- 
ganizations, etc., should be formed and strengthened. Into 
these organizations it is necessary to enlist those ex- 
members of the reformist and Catholic .trade unions and 
social-democatic and Catholic parties who are willing to 
fight against the fascists: 
In both types of fascist countries the center of gravity 
of the work must be transferred to the factories, where it 
will produce the best results, of course, if it is. carried on 
skillfully and energetically. 
a. Cadres 
a) The redistribution of forces before going under: 
ground is very important. In Germany it was the middle 
and lower active that suffered most in the process of transi- 
tion from the legal to the illegal position. Why? Because 
it was this active that came most in contact with the Na- 
tional-Socialists in the factories, in discussions in the dis- 
tricts, and finally, in open conflict with them. At the time of 
the fascist coup, the first thing the ~ational-~ocialists ried 
to do was to arrest this active. In this they were assisted by 
the petty-bourgeoi sie I who, after the victorv ofi the fascists 
elections, threw themselves into the arms of the 
Yational-Socialists. They pointed out where the Commu- 
g i s t s  lived, who iead the Rote Fohne, etc. The Party did not 
succeed in concealing the best of its active members. The 
biggest arrests of Communists in all towns took place imme- 
iately after the fascists burned the Reichstag, on the night 
f February 28. It  is characteristic that in spite of the fact 
at the provocation against the Communist Party had devel- 
oped to the utmost at that time, many of the leading Com- 
lunists stayed at their homes that night. 
Although our Party reorganized itself very quickly, it was 
ot in a position to save the middle and lower active, the 
preservation of which was very important for its future 
work, for it was this active that maintained contacts with 
the factories. Our sections must take measures to prevent 
this happening again. The Parties who are in danger of 
being driven underground in the near future must take mea- 
sures to .prevent the middle and lower active, not to speak 
of the leading active, staying at home when arrests take 
place. There is nothing terrible in prematurely leaving one's 
home; what is terrible is to be caught and sent to a con- 
centration camp and thus to be prevented from doing Party 
work. Comrade Pitxk, in his speech, said that even after 
utlawed, many Commitnists 
their homes to which 'they 
ir families. And this has happened not 
The more acute the class struggle becomes, the more per- 
sistently do the fascists shadow and hunt for our cadres, 
and the greater is the danger that our cadres will be ex- 
b) I t  is necessary to decentralize the work, both in order 
o develop local initiative and to minimize the losses in the 
event of arrests. Here I must say that before it went under- 
ground, the l d  organizations of the German Communist 
Party were shackled by an incredible centralism, a sort of 
super-centralism; We have spoken about this a rrxm of 
times. For example, for the sake of economy, manifestoes 
' used to printed in Berlin and distributed over the whole 
country without any consideration for the fact that these 
manifestoes might be suitable for the center, but not for 
, the districts, without any consideration for the necessity to 
adapt this literature to the conditions and industries in the 
districts, and to raise the questions that interest the respec- 
tive category of workers at the given moment. The 1-1 
organizations did not discuss any political questions until 
the Central Committee had defined its attitude towards &em. 
This shackled the initiative of the local Party organizations. 
But, to their honor be it said, the moment they were left 
without any leadership, owing to the fact that the middle 
and lower Party bodies had been paralyzed by arrests for 
a certain time, individual Communists and local organiza- 
tions displayed remarkable initiative. As Comrade Re& 
pointed out last night, the slogans issued independently by 
the local organizations were later on found to coincide with 
the slogans issued by the Central Committee. 
This local initiative is very important. The C&mmunist 
must not wait until the Party is driven underground to 
remember that he is a Communist and that he must pursue 
the Party line on his own responsibility. Decentralization 
must be introduced at once in preparation for the transition 
to an illegal position. This work is possible and necessary 
in view of the growing discontent of the masses and in 
view of the fact that the masses follow the lead of the 
Communists if they are given concrete guidance as to how 
to wage the struggle. 
c )  On the other hand, decentralization is necessary for 
the purpose of smecy. In  Germany a case recently occurred 
in which a scoundrel, who at one time had some connection 
with the Party leadership, roamed the streets of va-s 
towns- in the company of fascists who were searching for 
Communists, arresting them and exterminating them. The 
mote decentralization is carried out, the less possible will it 
be for traitors who have managed to penetrate into the 
Party to damage it. 
I do not know whether Comrade Ercoli mentioned in his 
speech what he told us privately, that in one place only six 
persons were arrested, but each of these mentioned several 
other names. In this way, the secret police managed to 
arrest 150 persons. Afterwards, a large number of thme 
were released, and no one knew which of these was the 
provocateur and which the denounced. As a result, the 
whole organization was demoralized. 
The d m u r n  of caution must be exercised in order to 
avoid arrests. I will quote another example for Germany : a 
certain ex-functionary of the Party, who had gone over to 
the fascists, turned up at a secret meeting place. At this 
place, without any investigations being made (although n ~ t  
long before that arrests had taken place in the district &is 
fellow' came from), he was given the secret address af the 
secretary of the Central Committee, a secretary who was 
underground, and whom the fascists were looking for. By 
a stroke of good fortune, the secretary was absent &'the 
time, and this fellow met another comrade, who w,as 
diately arrested. Direct contact with the secretary of the 
Party must under no circumstances be given to un$rust- 
worthy persons. Contact should be given only through inter- 
mediary links, and in this way the most effective safeguafds 
against arrest will be created. In the case I have just men- 
tioned the violation of the elementary principles of secrecy 
was totally unjustified, because it was known at this secret 
meeting place that big arrests had'  take^ place in the dis- 
trict from which this particular functi6nary had wived. 
I think it was even known that this person had actually been 
arrested and later released. In fact, he had been arrested, 
, and when the fascists began to beat him up he went over 
to their side. 
In the middle of June there were further big arrests in 
Germany and a number of active Party workers were 
seized. Better concealment, better work is necessary! . 
d) How should the Communists behave under exarnina- 
tion? It is necessary to bear in mind that once an arrested 
man has ' c o ~ u d c a t e d  mything at all, he will not be left 
in peace until he becomes a traitor. I must say that when 
oar Party was underground, we issued a specid pamphlet 
on how to behave under examination. If anyone in Ger- 
many is arrested and 'beaten up and he begins to talk, then 
the fasdst sadists do not let him alone, but keep on beating 
him until he betrays his comrades and goes over to the 
fascists. The less he talks, the less the fascist executioners 
will expect him to say, and the more quickly will they stop 
examining him. 
The popularization of the experience of the illegal work 
of tho Communist Parties of Poland, Bulgaria, Germany, 
Itsly, China and Japan is of enormous importance. We must 
see to it that the experience in every country shall be made 
known to all the Communist Parties. Individual Commu- 
nists must know how to behave under examination, and 
haw to avoid arrest under any given situation. 
e) Ifi those countries where the Cominunist Party is 
illegal, individual and group oral agitation is of enormous , 
importance (the exposure of the fascists and the Social- 
Democratic Party in connection with the urgent demands 
the masses, which should be linked up with the struggle 
for power). This agitation should be carried on among the 
broad masses and be backed by facts. In this way it will 
possible to enlarge the sphere of influence of the Com- 
unists. In this connection, the factory newspapers play 
important role. There was a moment when the fascists 
n Germany declared that the Communist Party had been 
utterly crushed, that it no longer existed. And our com- 
rades set themselves the task of getting Communist litera- 
ture into the streets at no matter what sacrifice. The Com- 
munist Party took to distributing literature and in this way 
showed that it was alive: This had enormous significance 
a t  that time. The foreign correspondents wrote about it to 
their newspapers, and even the fascist press could not 
ignore it. But this method of distributing literature must 
cease now. Literature must be energetically distributed, but 
this distribution must be organized 'in such a way as to 
involve as few arrests as possible, and above all, it must 
be organized so that the literature gets into the hands of 
those for whom it is intended, i.e., the workers. It is pre- 
cisely among the workers that we must distribute our liter- 
ature' in the first place. I t  goes without saying that the 
factory newspapers play a great role in this. Special atten- 
tion must be devoted to it. It is extremely important to 
utilize the popularity of the factory newspapers among the 
workers, to distribute them widely, to deal in them with all 
the general political questions, and questions affecting the 
given factory. + 14 , :g, 
f ) Finally, the organization of protest demonstrations: 
Here, too, we must take into account whether these are 
in legal or in illegal conditions. Take Austria. 
When the Party there was legal and organized demonstra- 
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tions, it was almost exclusively Party members who w e  
out on the streets. This showed that the Party's contact 
with the masses was very weak, and tEat it could not draw 
the masses into the struggle. Well, one can become recon- 
ciled to demonstrations in which only Party members take 
part when the Party is legal, although, of course, our task 
is to organize mass demonstrations; the loss in Party cadres 
involved in such exclusive demonstrations is relatively small. 
I t  is true that the police beat up a few of the comrades, 
arrested a few, but there the matter ended. But the damage 
caused by such exclusive demonstrations in countries where 
the Party is illegal is very much more serious. 
What is now happening in Germany? Here too we organ- 
ize demdnstrations, which is very important, enormously 
important. But whom do we bring out onto the streets?. 
Only our active. Our active is unable to bring large masses 
onto the streets, and so the fascists hurl themselves upon 
our members and exterminate them. Is it a good thing that 
demonstrations are organized, that protests are made? Of 
course it is. But it is bad that our cadres are exterminated. 
We must organize protests, but they must be imposing p r e  , 
tests, otherwise it is not worth while putting our cadres in 
danger of being shot down. It would be far better if they 
went to the factories and carried on agitation among the 
workers. This would produce bigger results than the small 
demonstrations that are now organized. 
g) The skilled distribution of forces and functions is very 
important, not only for legal, but also for illegal parties. 
I have already had occasion to state that there are no mem- 
bers of the Party who could not be useful to the Party. 
The question of utilizing their services is exclusively a mat- 
ter of leadership, both central and local. If a Communist 
- is not suitable as a propagandist he can perform certain 
technical functions; if he is not suitable as an agitator 
can distribute literature, stick up posters, etc. Tbe line ire 
take is as follows : if an old Party member is in the leader- 
ship, even if he is good for nothing, he h q  got to be ie- 
tained. Although -he cannot carry on any mass work, is . 
incapable of doing trade union work, nevertheless he is kft 
in the leadership. Even if he wrecks campaign aft& cam- 
paign, he is still left on that work. Why? H e  is an dd 
Party member. But here and there new cadres are corning 
rward who have contacts with the workers and know 
to approach the workers. Very often these are nut 
ized for permanent leading work in the Party organiza- 
ons or in mass workers' and peasants' organizations only 
the salaried positions are occupied by old Party 
s who are not able to cope with their work properly. . 
P course we must treasure our old Party members: for 
they have proved their loyalty to the Party, their 
ess to make sacrifices for the Party. Nevertheless, 
ur main criterion in approaching them should be: does 
this or that old Party member properly carry out the work 
he is entrusted with ? I f .  he does not do that work properJy 
then; although he may be an old Party member, he must be 
replaced by new cadres who are able to work, who have 
ontacts with the masses of the workers and are :blie to 
; If we have certain active workers who are able to work 
rIy well, s o  many duties are imposed upon them that tbep 
re unable to fulfill any of them. I will read you a 
nt received from the Communist Party of  raw:, 
A certain active member in Marles, near Calais,. ho& 
he following q&es : 
LI 1 Secretary of a trade union branch. - 
2) Secretary of the Communist Party nucleus. 
- .  3) Secretary of the Freethinkers Socie~y branch. 
4) ~reasure r  of the Freethinkers Society branch; 
(Laughter.) 
5) A inember of the Bureau of the Mutual Aid Society. 
6) Member of the Executive of the Miners' Upion. 
7) Member of the Distria Committee of the Communist 
Party. (Loud bugher.) . 
8) Member of the bureau of the Executive Committee of 
.the Miners' Union. 
g) Member of the Editorial Committee of the Miners' 
Union journal. 
10) Member of the Auditing M t t e e  of the Miners' 
Federation. 
11) ~ a i a ~ e r  of the Mutual Aid Fund 
r 2) Member of the ~ e t h u n e  Trades Council. 
13) Distributor of the newspapers L'Enckoine, La Voix 
du Mineur, Def ewe, &c. 
14) Dues collector (house to house) in a district other 
than the one in which he lives. 
15) Also does work in the "ARAC" (Ex-Servicemen's 
\ - 
LRague) - 
In addition to all these functions the comrade also fulfills 
the following functions in the district where he lives : 
I )  Does all the leaflet distribution. 
2) Sticks up posters. 
3) Collects money for special funds for the Party and 
the trade union as well as other organizations. 
"For an active member to have ten functions is quite nor- 
mal in orcr M k r d  Union." ( ~ e p o r t  by Comrade Henri 
at the Federal Bureau of the Unitary Confederation of 
Labor, October 1933.) 
The trouble here is not merely that this comrade cannot 
fulfill all these functions, and not merely that the work must 
suffer, but that the imposition of so many functions on a 
single comrade prevents the promotion of new cadres. If 
a single comrade badly fulfills sixteen functions, they could 
be well fulfilled by sixteen comrades if they were utilized 
for this work. We ourselves shout about the inadvisability 
of imposing many functions on a single comrade, but we 
do not improve the distribution of work, we make no prog- 
ress in this matter. This is harmful. This retards the 
creation of cadres. We must declare war on such a method 
of distributing the work. Every single Party member must 
be utilized and be given the opportunity to show what work 
he can do. 
IV. Conclusion 
The reformists and the social-democrats could not retain 
their positions in the working class if they had not behind 
them the bourgeoisie and its state. But from this it only 
follows that the agitation and organizational work of the 
Communist Patties and the revolutionary trade unions 
among the masses must be incomparably better than that 
carried qn by the reformists. 
Unfortunately, this is fax from being the case. 
The reformists give answers to the workers on all the 
urgent questions; of course, they give answers which corre- 
spond to their muin aim, viz, to serve the bourgeoisie and to 
betray the proletariat. 
The Communists can successfully expose the Social- 
Democratic Party and the reformists only if, to counteract 
the reformists, they, in a timely and revolutionary manner, 
respond to all the urgent needs of the broad masses of the 
workers on questions of wages, the working day, unemploy- 
ment insurance in all its forms, labor legislation, capitalist 
rationalization, etc., and at the same time, link all these 
questions up with the home and foreign politics of the 
country and with the preparation of the masses for the 
decisive struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
At the time of the first round of wars and revolutions no 
definitely formed monolithic Communist Parties as yet 
existed. Owing to this, the social-democrats and reformist 
trade unions managed to keep the revolution under their 
influence, to betray and smash up the vanguard of the 
working class. Today, Communist Parties exist, and their 
main and urgent task is to win the majority of the working 
class and guarantee the victory of the revolution. For this 
purpose the Communist Parties and the revolutionary trade 
movement must first of all expose the defects in their 
own work and remove them as quickly as possible in order 
to prevent the d d e r n o c r a t s  and the reformist trade 
union bureaucrats from betraying the working class again 
by leading them to be massacred in the interests of the 
bourgeoisie in time of war, and by saving capitalism from 
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